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ADVERTISEMENTS AND SPONSORSHIPS
IN CHARITABLE CYBERSPACE: VIRTUAL
REALITY MEETS LEGAL FICTION
Darryll K Jones*
I. INTRODUCTION

By now, it is perhaps cliche to quote Sir Walter Scott's
familiar refrain' when referring to communications occurring
via the World Wide Web (the Web).2 And yet, that age-old
wisdom comes readily to mind when one considers the unrelated business income tax (UBIT) as it relates to charities
that, for consideration paid, participate in a profit-seeker's
web-based marketing communications. That first lie, to be
precise, is that a charity's payment-induced, unlimited public
display of a profit-seeker's logo, slogan and product, when
unaccompanied by "comparative or qualitative descriptions" or
explicit requests to buy, results in no trade or business income
for purposes of UBIT. 4 Thus, the Orange Bowl Committee5 is
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
"Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practise to deceive!" Sir
Walter Scott, LAY OF THE LAST MINSTREL, Canto vi. Stanza 17, in THE COMPLETE

WORKS OF ScowT 71 (Horace E. Scodder ed., 1920).
2 References to Sir Walter Scott's "tangled web" in conjunction with discussions of the World Wide Web abound in the legal literature. See, e.g., Shelby
Clark, Note, "What a Tangled Web We Weave, When First We Practice To Deceive': Frames, Hyperlinks, Metatags, and Unfair Competition on The World Wide
Web, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1333 (1999); Brian I. Simon, Note and Comment, The
Tangled Web We Weave: The Internet and Standing Under the Fourth Amendment,
21 NOVA L. REV. 941 (1997); Robert A. Bourque & Kerry L. Konrad, The Tangled
Web: First Wave of Internet Cases Provides More Questions Than Answers, 8 J.
PROPRIETARY RTs. 2 (1996).

The UBIT is the subject of 26 U.S.C. §§ 511-14 (1984). Hereinafter, citations to the Internal Revenue Code will be I.R.C. and all references thereto are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1984 as amended to date.
' The idea that income derived in exchange for a charity's public acknowl-
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not selling anything when, upon receipt of value, it renames
its football game from "The Orange Bowl," to "The FedEX
Orange Bowl," and then incessantly repeats that name in its
media, including its official Website.6 And now, as that lie is
unloosed in Cyberspace,7 it looks as though it will undergo a
period of growth at least as intense and exponential as the
growth of the Web itself.' Indeed, to avoid exposure of the

edgment of a profit-seeker's payment thereof is exempt from taxation, while revenues derived from a charity's paid provision of advertising space to the same
profit-seeker is taxable, was first officially announced in Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.513-4, 58 Fed. Reg. 5687 (1993). The quoted phrase is taken from the
proposed regulations. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4, 58 Fed. Reg. 5687 (1993).
' The Orange Bowl Committee, Inc. is tax exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
See Internal Revenue Service, ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS MASTER LIST (2000).
' The Orange Bowl Committee's web site is at <http://www.orangebowl.
org/main.asp> (visited Oct. 11, 2000). FedEx, a 19 billion dollar for-profit corporation, became The Orange Bowl Committee's title sponsor in 1989. See <httpJ/
www.Fedex.com/ustsports/orangebowl/fedexorangebowl/index.html> (visited Oct. 11,
2000); see also <httpJ/www.swbellcottonbowl.com> (visited Nov. 17, 2000 (web site
for Southwestern Bell Cotton Bowl); <http://www.tostistos fiestabowl.com> (visited
Nov. 17, 2000) (web site for Tostitos Fiesta Bowl).
' The term "Cyberspace" was first used by the science fiction novelist and
short story writer, William Gibson, who also described a computer realm-a virtual reality-in which humans could interact for business or pleasure. WILLIAM
GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
' In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court noted the "extraordinary growth" of the Internet:
The number of "host" computers-those that store information and relay
communications-increased from about 300 in 1981 to approximately
9,400,000 by . . . 1996. Roughly 60% of these hosts are located in the
United States. About 40 million people used the Internet at the time of
trial, a number that is expected to mushroom to 200 million by 1999.
521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). Of course, the Web represents only one part of the
"Internet," a term which is technically meant to apply to all forms of electronic
computer communication, including electronic mail and electronic bulletin boards.
See generally Timothy Wu, Essay: Application Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1163 (1999) (arguing that Internet is comprised of many applications in addition to world wide web and that single legal construct is inappropriate for various
applications of Internet); Clark, supra note 2, at 1334 ("The Web, at its simplest,
is a portion of the Internet characterized by hyperlinks."). The Web is growing so
fast that estimates of its size (by reference to the number of users) are necessarily
conservative. One e-commerce industry association puts the number of U.S. and
Canadian adult Internet users at 92.2 million (up from 22 million in 1995). See
CommerceNet, Internet Population, available at <httpJ/www.commerce.net/research/stats/wwwpop.html> (visited Oct. 10, 2000). The same group estimates the
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original lie, the law must weave ever more elaborate patterns
of necessarily myopic rules having no relationship to the reality or virtual reality of marketing communications.9
The more fundamental legal fiction embodied in the distinction between a charity's sale of advertisement from its
acknowledgment of sponsorships is that the latter is neither
properly nor customarily considered conducive to a profitseeker's marketing communication goals (i.e., to sell more
goods or services). 10 Therefore, a charitable media's receipt of

number of 1999 adult web users at 73.3 million (up from 14.3 million in 1995),
indicating that the world wide web is becoming synonymous with the Internet, as
some authors have noted. Id; see also Haran C. Rashes, The Impact of Telecommunication Competition and The Telecommunications Act of 1996 on Internet Service Providers, 16 TEMP. ENV'TL. L. & TECH. J. 49, 58 (1997). A report commissioned by the United States Department of Commerce states that "Internet traffic
doubles every 100 days." U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY 8 (1998), available at <httpJ/www.doc.gov/ecommerce/emerging.htm> (visited Oct.
10, 2000). In light of such figures, estimates to the effect that by 2000 the worldwide Internet population will be approximately 150 million seem woefully conservative. See Kuen-Hee Ju-Pak, Content dimensions of Web advertising: a cross-national
comparison, 18 INT'L J. ADVERTISING 207, 207 (1999) (stating that number of persons using Web worldwide will reach 150 million adults in 2000). In fact, the number of persons with access to the Internet grew to 304 million as of March 2000.
United States Department of Commerce, Digital Economy 2000 at 7 (2000), available at <http://www.esa.doc.gov/de2000.pdf> (visited Nov. 1, 2000).
The opening premise, for example, in the Internal Revenue Service's effort
to distinguish between sponsorship and advertising on a charity's web site is this:
a stationary banner can be a mere acknowledgement, but a moving banner is
probably advertising. Cheryl Chasin et al., Tax Exempt Organizations and World
Wide Web Fundraisingand Advertising on The Internet in Internal Revenue Service, ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TEXT FOR FY
2000 120 (1999) (available via Westlaw at 1999 TNT 169-20, at 14-15 ("a link
will retain the passive character associated with corporate sponsorship while a
moving banner is more likely to be considered to be advertising."). In Part III, I
show why this distinction is entirely over-simplistic and already overcome by technology and advertising science.
1 In Announcement 92-15, for example, the Service stated:
Payments an exempt organization receives from donors are nontaxable
contributions where there is no expectation that the organization will
provide a substantial return benefit. Mere recognition of a corporate
contributor as a benefactor normally is incidental to the contribution and
not of sufficient value to the contributor to constitute unrelated trade or
business.
I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B. 51. Certainly, the assertion has historical
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cash or in-kind benefit in return for a public acknowledgment
thereof does not unfairly deprive taxable media of revenue
sources." This is so, according to the implicit reasoning, because marketing communication purchased from taxable media is always explicit, never so subtle as to occur without an
explicit call to action or qualitative inducement to buy the
subject brand immediately. 2 Hence, charitable media is selling something altogether different from that being sold by taxable media. The underlying reasoning, though, assumes away
the more likely and sophisticated occurrence of the coordinated, multi-media marketing campaign dependent in part on
simple brand awareness but, nevertheless, eventually designed to elicit a consumer purchase response." The reason-

validity, as sponsorship was indeed once thought of as a purely philanthropic act,
unmotivated by the hope of return benefit:
Earlier perceptions of sponsorship tended to regard it as in the donations category, with perhaps the primary beneficiary being the recipient.
Commercialism in sponsorship exchanges was often lacking, with the
sponsorship budget being administered in client companies by a public
affairs or similar type of department which viewed such "giving" as part
of its societal responsibility. Recipients viewed such sponsorship in philanthropic terms with little requirement to return commercial value.
Tony Meenaghan, Current Developments & Future Directions in Sponsorship, 17
INT'L. J. ADVERTISING 3, 10 (1998). In Part III, we see that the sponsorship is no
longer a philanthropic or altruistic activity, if indeed it ever was, but is instead
motivated entirely by the hope of profit.
" Unfairness would result from the violation of the fundamental tax notion of
"horizontal equity"-the idea that similarly situated persons should be similarly
taxed. See generally Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures In Search of A
Principle, 42 NAVL TAX J. 139 (1989). It is unfair to tax one entity that sells
widgets if another entity selling the same widgets is exempt from tax.
12 Compare Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993) (defining
advertising for purposes of UBIT) with Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c), 58 Fed.
Reg. 5690 (1993) (defining sponsorship acknowledgments for purposes of UBIT).
" One group of researchers state the point thusly:
Initially it is important to appreciate that sponsorship is merely one
element of a wider communication mix and as such must be consistent
with all the other components. Integration is therefore particularly relevant [reference omitted]. Essentially, each method of marketing communication assists in achieving the overall marketing communication objective.
Des Thwaites, Rafael Aguilar-Majarrez & Callum Kidd, 17 INTL. J. ADVERTISING
29, 32-33 (1998).
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ing instead seems based upon a most primitive, even Pavlovian 4 view of marketing communication; one dominated by
advertisement characterized solely by a profit-seeker's presentation of an explicit verbal or pictorial inducement (the
advertising stimuli) in the context of media communication,
followed by a consumer's immediately rushing to the store to
buy the item which is the subject of the inducement (the conditioned purchase response)."5 To the extent this view of marketing communication is false, so too is the distinction between sponsorship and advertising revenue.
Tax law, of course, is quintessentially an interdisciplinary
science. The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) makes sense
and, in individual instances, achieves its purpose only insofar
as it takes into account the realities of the various contexts in
which it is to apply." The purpose of the UBIT, as discussed

4 Through experimentation, the Russian physiologist, Ivan Pavlov, discovered
the "conditioned reflex." See I.P. Pavlov, The Conditioned Reflex, in I.P. PAVLOV:
SELECTED WoRKS at 245, 248 (Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955). Essentially, Pavlov showed that an animal could be trained to exhibit a certain physiological response appropriate to one stimulus--e.g., salivating in response to the
placement of an acid into the dog's mouth-upon the occurrence of another stimulus which normally would not evoke the response-salivating solely in response to
the ringing of a bell-if that second stimulus had previously been made to occur
prior to every instance in which first, appropriate stimulus occurred. Id.
" The Service's approach to advertising, particularly via the Web, is Pavlovian
to the extent that it rests upon the assumption that a user will not click on a
stationary banner and thereby go to a for-profit's homepage containing explicit
inducements and qualitative statements, but will be induced, perhaps involuntarily, to click on a blinking or moving banner. That seems to be the only logical
premise underlying the Service's speculation that a blinking banner constitutes
advertisement if the banner is linked to a for-profit's website containing explicit
inducements or qualitative statements, but a non-blinking banner linked to the
same site is not advertising. See Chasin et al., supra note 9.
" Primarily for reasons related to the need for easy and uniform enforcement,
the Code does not always conform precisely to the substantive knowledge of the
field to which it relates. For example, income in the economic sense might be
present even before an item of value is sold or otherwise exchanged. See HENRY
C. SIMoNS, PERSONAL INcOME TAXATION 50 (1938) (defining income to include untapped appreciation in property). But the law would be difficult to administer if,
for example, gross income included the increase in the value of real property even
before the property is sold. In such cases, the taxpayer might not have cash to
pay the tax, and the government would be required to devise some way of measuring the increase, each and every year, of each and every taxpayer's property.
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in Part II, is to eliminate a market distortion thought to occur
when a tax-exempt entity is allowed to sell the same product
or services available from a taxable entity.1 The basic
premise is that a tax exempt entity can sell the identical product or service at a lesser price and thereby drive its taxable
competitors out of the market because the exempt entity's
costs are less than a taxable entity's cost by an amount equal
to the foregone tax."5 Thus, the UBIT scheme achieves its

A tax code definition of income that coincided with an economic definition of income would therefore be administratively unworkable. As a result, the code treats
income as occurring only upon the happening of a "realization event." I.R.C.
§ 1001 (2000); see Cottage Says. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991)
("Rather than assessing tax liability on the basis of annual fluctuations in the
value of a taxpayer's property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax consequences of a gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer 'realizes' the gain
or loss."). In pronouncing a distinction between nontaxable sponsor acknowledgements and taxable advertisements, the Service noted that its distinction was in
some respects inconsistent with the reality of marketing communications:
The principle of administrative simplicity governs the rules defining advertising and acknowledgements in the proposed regulations. As a result,
the lines drawn between activities constituting advertising and acknowledgements may not relate to the substance of the activities. For example, distribution of samples of a sponsor's product to the general public
at a sponsored event is substantively an inducement to buy the sponsor's
product and, therefore, advertising. However, the proposed regulations
provide that distribution of samples of a sponsor's product constitutes
acknowledgment rather than advertising.
58 Fed. Reg. 5688 (1993). But unlike the administrative difficulty giving rise to the
'realization" requirement, there seems nothing so difficult about treating a profitseeker's distribution of free samples as advertising.
"7 See generally Donald L. Sharpe, Unfair Business Competition and the Tax
on Income Destined For Charity: Forty-Six Years Later, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 367, 38593 (1996) (describing and analyzing unfair competition concerns leading to enactment of UBIT); Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605, 614-621 (1989) (discussing several types of
market inefficiencies that would result in absence of UBIT); Susan RoseAckerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV.
1017 (1982) (acknowledging unfair business rationale, but disputing its validity
from economic standpoint).
18 "[Tax exemption] creates the potential for nonprofit organizations to compete
unfairly with the private sector by using the absence of tax payments as a vehicle for charging a lower price than for-profit providers of identical or similar
services (taxes being a cost of production that must be paid by taxable entities in
the private sector)." Dennis Zimmerman, Corporate Title Sponsorship Payments To
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purpose with respect to advertising by taxing advertising
revenues derived by charitable media. 9 In doing so, the Code
purports to eliminate an unintended market distortion-the
incentive for purchasers of advertiseing space to favor less
costly charitable media over taxable media. To be thorough,
Part II begins by showing that the whole premise of the UBIT
is probably incorrect. The feared result, charitable monopolization of whole industries, is highly unlikely in the real world
and even more unlikely in Cyberspace.
For the sake of argument, Part III assumes the legitimacy
of the concerns motivating the UBIT scheme and then explains how UBIT came to be applied to advertisements appearing in charitable media, as well as the sorry history regarding the distinction between advertising and sponsorship
revenues. The Internal Revenue Service (the Service), in a
commendable demonstration of intellectual honesty, once
concluded that sponsorship revenue was indeed no different
than any other form of advertising revenue and should therefore be subject to taxation. ° There were essentially two problems with the Service's pronouncement, one substantive and
the other procedural, though neither undermined the correctness of the conclusion. As a substantive matter, the Service's
conclusion was largely intuitive and therefore subject to easy
and, indeed, unprincipled refutation.2 1 As a procedural matter, the Service's conclusion was made with regard to a college

Nonprofit College Football Bowl Games: Should They be Taxed?, Congressional

Research Service Report No. 92-157E (1992) (available via Westlaw at 92 TNT 4118).
If I.R.C. § 513(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(d)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(iv),
Examples 3-7.
20 Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991). The facts and analysis of
the
Service's initial ruling are discussed in greater detail in Part III. See infra notes
78-81 and accompanying text.
21 Cynthia G. Farbman, Forced To Be a Fan: An Analysis and History of the
IRS's Proposed Regulations Regarding Corporate Sponsorship, 2 SPORTS LAW. J.

53, 60-61 (1995) (discussing one exempt organization's attack on Service's actions
because of "startling absence" of economic analysis); Paul Steckfus, Proposed Corporate Sponsorship Regulations, 7 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 379, 379 (1993) (refer-

ring to arguments in response to Service's pronouncement in TAM 9147007 (which
arguments eventually prevailed) as "patently ridiculous" and "false.").
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football bowl game happening, as such games traditionally do,
in the midst of the Christmas holiday season.22 One might
speculate that the great "hue and cry"' in response to the
Service's conclusion could not have been greater had the Service proposed to tax the celebration of Christmas itself.24 In
any event, the Service's omission of any empirical support for
its conclusion, coupled with its impolitic unveiling of that
conclusion with regard to a well-beloved event occurring during the most beloved of times, resulted in such an uproar that
the Service mounted what can only be described as a hasty
retreat. It quickly issued proposed regulations (the original
proposed regulations) 25 stating that sponsorship was in fact
different from advertisement, and revenues generated thereby
would not be subject to taxation after all. 2' The Service never
finalized the original proposed regulations 27 but its retreat
22 The "Southwestern Bell Cotton Bowl" is played on New Year's Day in Dal-

las, Texas. See <httpJ/www.swbellcottonbowl.com> (visited Nov. 17, 2000).
2" Paul Streckful, IRS' Pre-Inaugural Gift For Charities, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX.
REv. 179, 179 (1993). (referring to firestorm of criticism from charities and national media as "the hue and cry.").
24 "College football inspires strong feelings in the United States. Although
baseball may be the national pastime, it is college football bowl games we associate with Homecoming, New Year's Day celebrations, holidays spent with families
and cold November days shared with close friends." Elizabeth M. Roberts, Note,
Presented To You By... : Corporate Sponsorship and The UBIT, 17 VA. TAX
REv. 399, 414 (1997).
' Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4, 58 Fed. Reg. 5687 (1983). (hereinafter referred
to as the "original proposed regulations"). Soon after it released TAM 9147007,
the Service published and requested public comment on formal guidelines designed for field agents conducting audits of charitable organizations regarding the
receipt of sponsorship revenues (the audit guidelines). See I.R.S. Announcement
92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B. 51. The TAM and the audit guidelines were met with near
universal condemnation. Roberts, supra note 24, at 406-09; Nathan Wirtschafter,
Note and Comment, Fourth Quarter Choke: How the IRS Blew the Corporate
Sponsorship Game, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1465, 1487-96 (1994). The Service then
quickly issued the original proposed guidelines in hopes of undercutting the motivations for imminent Congressional action designed to overturn the TAM and
audit guidelines. Farbman, supra note 21, at 67.
26 For a timeline and discussion of the Service's issuance of TAM 9147007 and
its issuance of the original proposed regulations, see Wirtschafter, supra note 25.
27 In fact, the original proposed regulations were withdrawn and replaced by a
second set of regulations, referred to in the text below as "the revised proposed
regulations." See Withdrawal of Previous Proposed Rules, Notice of Proposed
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was made permanent when Congress enacted I.R.C. § 513(i),
essentially codifying the original proposed regulations. 28
Since enactment of I.R.C. § 513(i) the Service has continued a rear guard effort to maintain at least a semblance of
fidelity to the goal of the UBIT as it relates to marketing communications.2 9 Part III continues by describing the Service's
latest proposal (the revised proposed regulations)" by which

Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing, 67 Fed. Reg. 11012 (Mar. 1, 2000)
[hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].
28 I.R.C. § 513(i) exempts "qualified sponsorship payments" from taxation under the UBIT scheme. The provision distinguishes between sponsorship and advertisement in the same manner as did the Service in its proposed regulations:
[tihe term "qualified sponsorship" payment means any payment made by
any person engaged in a trade or business with respect to which there
is no arrangement or expectation that such person will receive any substantial return benefit other than the use or acknowledgement of the
name or logo (or product lines) of such person's trade or business in connection with the activities of the organization that receives such payment. Such a use or acknowledgement does not include advertising such
person's products or services (including messages containing qualitative
or comparative language, price information, or other indications of savings or value, an endorsement, or an inducement to purchase, sell, or
use such products or services).
I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(A) (2001).
2" Many commentators viewed the Service's issuance of the original proposed
regulations as evidence that the Service had capitulated to the selfish interests of
exempt organizations that cared nothing for tax policy but sought only to continue enjoying a pot of tax free revenue. See David A. Brennan, The Proposed Corporate Sponsorship Regulations: Is The Treasury Department "Sleeping With The
Enemy?" 6 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLY 49 ,50 (1996) (arguing that Service's original
proposed regulations were "bad policy-making" and represented Treasury
Department's pandering attitude towards charities); Wirtschafter, supra note 25
(concluding that IRS "compromised [its] organizational integrity" when it issued
the proposed regulations). The more accurate view, however, is that charities
(particularly the college football marketeers) enjoyed considerable influence in
Congress and the Service recognized that charities would soon convince Congress
to enact legislation overruling the Service's decision to tax sponsorship revenue.
Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy:
"Rent-Seeking" Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 WIs. L. REV. 971, 1023-24.
Having correctly recognized that it was about to lose the fight to preserve the
goal of UBIT with regard to sponsorship revenues, the Service instead settled for
second best by seeking to maintain some influence over the final product. James
J. McGovern, Service's McGovern Explains Proposed Corporate Sponsorship Regulations, 58 TAx NoTES 795, 796 (1993).
"0 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,012 (2000).
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to articulate a difference between sponsorship and advertisement. But like its earlier conclusion that there was no difference, the Service's forced assertion that indeed there is a difference is largely, and necessarily, intuitive. As a result, the
revised regulations are subject to easy, though in this case
quite principled, refutation largely for the reasons later stated
in Part IV-i.e., the very scientific marketing communication
process depends on subtle appeals to the consumer equally
available from charitable and taxable media and, therefore,
taxing one media and not the other will create a distorting
market effect to the disadvantage of taxable media.
It really doesn't take high science, though, to know that
exempting revenues derived from sponsorship undermines the
purpose of the UBIT, at least with regard to the marketing of
audience. Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV, marketing
communication science is thoroughly misunderstood or, more
likely, ignored altogether in Congress' decision to exempt
revenues derived from a charitable media's acknowledgement
of a profit-seeker's payment.3 ' Sophisticated marketing communication has progressed beyond the stereotypical-that
characterized by an explicit request to "buy now!" or an explicit assertion that a profit-seeker's product is better than all the
rest and therefore should be preferred over any other
brand.32 Part IV shows that marketing communication is a
"1 A 1992 Congressional Research Service Report informed Congress that the
charitable solicitation of sponsorship revenue competed with taxable media's solicitation of advertising revenue. See Zimmerman, supra note 18. Congress nevertheless decided to exempt such revenues from taxation in 1997. Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 965, 111 Stat. 788, 893-94 (1997).
" Internet Advertising Bureau and Millward Brown Interactive, 1997
INTERNET ONLINE ADVERTISING EFFECTIVENESS STUDY at 25 (available at
<httpJ/www.iab.net>) (visited Nov. 15, 2000).
While an immediate purchase response to advertising would be ideal, it
is the rare exception. Rather than inducing consumers to "buy right
now," most advertising works by locking appropriate brand-linked memories into long-term memory. By doing so, the advertising creates expectations for brands such that the consumer is more willing to try the product when in an experimentation mood (packaged goods) or is more likely
to investigate the product further (in the case of considered purchase
products).
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much more subtle endeavor largely and sometimes solely
dependent upon simple brand awareness equally obtained
from sponsorship as from stereotypical advertising. Indeed,
sponsorship is no longer viewed as a philanthropic or altruistic act unmotivated by the receipt of quid pro quo. It is, in,stead, an unabashedly profit-maximizing behavior with the
same ultimate goal as stereotypical advertising.33 To the extent, then, that charitable media is able to sell the same product-audience access for the purpose of generating profits-as
taxable media without having to incur the tax cost of doing so,
the market distortion sought to be eliminated by the
UBIT-again assuming the validity of the concerns motivating
UBIT-remains.
The futility of the Service's efforts will nowhere be more
apparent than in Cyberspace. Part V will revisit the empirical
data regarding the ways and means of marketing communication, giving particular attention to the burgeoning science of
marketing products and services via the Internet. Already, the
Service's attempt to distinguish sponsorship banners from
advertising banners seems entirely over-simplistic and indeed
outdated relative to the progress of information systems science. Tax-free sponsorship revenue is said to occur when a
charity displays a profit-seeker's hyperlinked, but non-blinking
.banner in exchange for cash (assuming the message contained
in the banner contains no inducements to buy), while taxable
advertising revenue results from displaying a hyperlinked,
blinking banner (even though the banner contains no inducements to buy). 4 Here again, the Service's conceptualization

Id.
3 Richard Speed & Peter Thompson, Determinants of Sports Sponsorship Response 28 AcAD. MARKETING Sci. J., 226, 227 (2000).

Sponsorship has been defined as "provision of assistance either financial
or in kind to an activity by a commercial organization for purposes of
achieving commercial objectives. The involvement of a second party, that
is, the activity sponsored, distinguishes sponsorship from advertising, and
the commercial motivation distinguishes sponsorship from altruism."
Id.

34 Chasin et al., supra note 9.
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of advertisement under the Pavlovian stimuli-response model
is apparent and, as profit-seekers surely know, very much behind the evolution of web-based marketing communications.
The emergence of the Web, of course, was not the impetus
for the legal fiction that sponsorship is somehow different
from advertisement. The Web acts instead to complicate the
regulatory effort to defend and maintain the plausibility of
that legal fiction. 5 In the real world, the separation between
mere acknowledgement of a profit-seeker's economic support
on the one hand, and a profit-seeker's explicit inducement to
buy on the other allows for plausible deniability. That is, in
the real world, the Code can plausibly assert that charitable
media's marketing of audience share is different from, and
therefore noncompetitive with, taxable media's marketing of
audience share. The plausibility is made possible primarily by
the enforcement of separate spatial and nonspatial positions
for sponsorship and stereotypical advertisements so that there
is always a distance between the two. Thus, a charity's display
of a profit-seeker's logo and even its products, is mere acknowledgment when it is not accompanied in time or space by
qualitative inducements. As a practical matter, the profitseeker is forced to await some other time or place in which to
present the viewer with a qualitative inducement to buy. In
Cyberspace, though, distance is nonexistent, whether measured by reference to time or geography.3 6 In other words,
there is no "distance" between two positions in Cyberspace."

" In its notice of proposed rulemaking with regard to the revised proposed
regulations, the Service solicits public comment regarding the application of the
sponsorship/advertisement distinction in Cyberspace. See Taxation of Tax-Exempt
Organizations' Income from Corporate Sponsorship, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,012, 11,015
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1 (proposed Mar. 1, 2000)).
"' "In [Cyberspace], on which every computer screen is a window, actual, geographic distance is irrelevant." Simon, supra note 2, at 958.
" After only a little time "surfing" the web, even the most computer illiterate
user will know this fact intuitively. Nevertheless, I include several user observations to confirm intuition. For example, "the power of the Web stems from the
ability of a link to point to any document, regardless of its status or physical
location." American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D.
Pa. 1996).
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A web viewer of what the Code defines as a mere acknowledgement is not some requisite distance away from an explicit
inducement to buy such that charitable media's marketing of
audience share has no effect on taxable media's revenues from
marketing audience.38 A web viewer is instead a viewer, according to the viewer's own volition, of any explicit inducements to buy associated (in the Cyberspace sense) with that
acknowledgement. There is no motivation to create, much less
enforce, spatial or nonspatial distances in Cyberspace (as
Cyberspace is intended to exist).39 Therefore, whatever plausibility supported the distinction between sponsorship and stereotypical advertisement in the real world is simply nonexistent in Cyberspace.
Part IV, the article's concluding section, articulates two
possible solutions to the Service's dilemma. To maintain the
plausibility that exempting sponsorship revenues from taxation does not result in market distortion, the Service must tax
the revenues derived from any form of web-based acknowledgment that is hyperlinked ° to a profit-seeker's web page
containing information that would constitute advertising. Any
other regulatory effort will be undoubtedly in vain, as the web

" In American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, the court found that the links
on the Web are designed to take a viewer from one document to another in one
tenth of a second. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 837.
" Indeed, it is axiomatic that the "World Wide Web was designed for linking."
Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines
With Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43, 88 (1998).
40 See Clark, supra note 2, at 1334.
A hyperlink is text or some other screen element, such as an image,
that when clicked on with a mouse pointer, opens another electronic
document. The element to be clicked on is "linked" to the desired document with special programming and the electronic address of that document; this address can identify any document on any server computer
that is connected to the Internet. Hyperlinked text (text that is to be
clicked on, also known as hypertext) is usually colored differently than
surrounding text, or underlined, or both. A mouse pointer moved over a
hyperlinked element changes form, e.g., from an arrow to a hand with
one finger extended, to indicate that clicking on this element will activate a hyperlink.
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continues to condense and make entirely irrelevant the concept of distance. Recalling though, that the supposed dire
consequences of not taxing charity when it markets its audience (or engages in any sort of unrelated business activity) are
simply unlikely, the Service could decide to ignore the fundamental characteristic of Cyberspace-the condensation of time
and space-and thereby acknowledge the fact that
hyperlinking destroys the utility of spatial and nonspatial
distance. Under this proposal, a web banner appearing on a
charity's web site would be judged sponsorship or advertisement solely at face value and without regard to a hyperlinked
page accessible via the banner, or the probability that the banner will induce the viewer to view the hyperlinked page. Both
proposals are preferable to an attempt to perpetuate a distinction between sponsorship and advertisement in Cyberspace
because the real world distinction is based upon the enforcement of distance between information and the concept of distance is irrelevant in Cyberspace.
II. THE LOGIC OF THE UBIT IN REALITY AND VIRTUAL
REALITY

There is something surreal about the notion that if charities are allowed to systematically engage in noncharitable,
profit-generating activities without being taxed, they will
inevitably prevent all other taxable entities from engaging in
the same activity.4 It is as though charitable entities repre-

The UBIT was added to the Tax Code by the Revenue Act of 1950. Pub. L.
No. 81-814, § 301, 64 Stat. 906, 947-53 (1950) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§§ 502, 511-514 (1994)). Referring to the perceived need to impose the unrelated
business tax scheme, the Senate Finance Committee stated that if certain transactions were not addressed "exempt . . . organizations may own the great bulk of
commercial and industrial real estate in the country." S. Rep. No. 81-2375, at 31
(1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3084 (referring to "sale-leaseback"
transaction to which I.R.C. § 514 (1994) is addressed).
At the time that the [UBIT] was enacted, some argued that without the
tax businesses owned by exempt nonprofits would exploit their cost advantage to drive their for-profit competitors out of business. In this way,
it was said, whole industries might ultimately be captured by nonprofits.
"
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sent a kind of initially benevolent creation that, if left unattended, might easily mutate into a malevolent entity. Because
of their tax exemption, the reasoning goes, charities will be
able to undercut prices, on the one hand, and expand faster
than taxable participants on the other.4 2 Eventually, economic activity will be monopolized by nonprofit entities. The
UBIT, which makes charities pay the same tax as taxable
entities when those charities are engaged in noncharitable
activities, is designed to prevent that consequence.
The surrealism in the feared consequences derives, perhaps, from the fact that entities are merely individuals who
join together to engage in economic activities, and from the
unlikely Utopian idea that most individuals really would prefer altruism over personal wealth if only the tax laws would
not tax their joint efforts. That is, individuals would prefer to
produce and market commodities at cost for the common good,
rather than for personal profit. After all, the price of conducting business in the nonprofit form-the price that individuals
and their society would bear in allowing the nonprofit form to
dominate economic activity-is the accumulation of personal
wealth.43 Individuals who engage in activities under the nonprofit form must adhere to the "nondistribution constraint"'
and therefore cannot take unto themselves any profit generated by the activity. To say that unchecked, unrelated business

Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and The Unrelated Business Income Tax,
75 VA. L. REV. 605, 609 (1989).
4" Note, Colleges, Charities, and The Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851,
875 (1951). For an oft-cited critique of these arguments from an economic standpoint, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (1982).
" The prohibition against private inurement, contained in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998), prohibits a charity's distribution of profit. I.R.C. § 4958
(Supp. IV 1998) imposes personal liability on the recipients of such profit, as well
as on "organization managers" who knowingly allow such distribution. For a detailed discussion of the prohibition against the distribution of profit, see Darryll
K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and
Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575 (2000).
" Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
838-839 (1980) (using phrase, "nondistribution constraint" to describe prohibition
against profit distribution characteristic of nonprofit organizations).
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of charities would drive out taxable activity is therefore to
accept the surrealistic notion that most people do not want to
get rich.
The preceding point is most valid from a macro-economic
standpoint. That is, whole industries are likely to be dominated by charities only to the extent most individuals want to
forego the chance for individual wealth inherent in the conduct of the industry. Only to the extent that individuals can
conduct the activity and still get rich will the premise of charitable hegemony with regard to a particular industry hold
true. 5 In the micro-economic sense, the premise of UBIT has
somewhat greater, though still questionable, validity. Suppose,
for example, an economy with just two firms, one taxable and
the other nontaxable. If all other things are exactly identical,
it should be expected that the nontaxable entity could produce
a commodity at less cost than its taxable counterpart, charge
lower prices, and thereby reduce or eliminate the taxable
participant's profits.46 But to do so, the nontaxable entity

' This assertion is implicit in the previously articulated observation that if an
activity holds the potential for profit, investors will contribute capital to the conduct of that activity. See Comment, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business
By Tax-Exempt Organizations, 32 CHI. L. REv. 581, 592 (1965).
" The assertion that an income tax is not a cost of production and therefore
will not have an impact on the costs of commodities sold by nonprofit organizations has been adequately addressed elsewhere:
The income tax, being a levy on profits, is not, it is argued an element
in the cost of production and hence will not affect the price at which the
sellers of commodities are willing to offer their wares to the public. Contrary views have been expressed by eminent authorities who hold that
while it is true that the income tax is not an element in the cost of
production, nevertheless, a manufacturer who knows that he will not
have to pay any income tax can afford to fix his prices at a point where
the profit would be smaller than that of his competitor who must pay
the income tax. People do not engage in business, it is argued, to gain
less than a certain minimum profit or risk their capital to the hazards
of trade for insubstantial returns. Profit itself, we are told, enters into
the determination to undertake enterprises and is an element in the
determination of prices; and if such be the case, it is obvious that a tax
levy on profits would be an important element in the consideration of
the price structure, and the exemption from the income tax would be a
substantial benefit to a competitor.
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would have to reduce or eliminate its own profit margin as
well. That is, the nontaxable entity would be required to reduce prices below its competitor's, and eventually its own cost,
and thereby share some of its tax exemption with consumers.4 7 This sort of predatory pricing is unlikely,4" assuming,
as the UBIT regime does, that the nontaxable entity's participation in the particular industry is motivated by profit maximization.4 9 First, a charity would have to accept great and
prolonged risks to its own economic well-being, depending on
how long the price war continues and the charity's own financial stability, and would probably not recoup the costs incurred in doing so."° Second, a nontaxable entity, is by defini-

Maurice Finkelstein, Freedom From Uncertainty In Income Tax Exemptions, 48
MICH. L. REv. 449, 460 (1950).
'7 Consider the following discussion from an early writer on the subject:
[Tihe price-cutting advantages of an exempt over a taxable business are
dubious. Suppose two corporations are identical in all respects except
that A is tax-exempt and B is not. Assuming the corporate tax rate to
be 50%, if A is making 10 [cents] on the dollar, then B is making 5
(cents]. If A cuts its price so that it makes only 5 [cents], B will cut its
price until it is making only 2 1/2 [cents]. This price cut has resulted in
a greater absolute loss to A than to B. If A further cuts its prices until
it makes only 1 [cent], B will cut its prices until it is making 1/2 [cent].
It is apparent that A's absolute advantage over B declines proportionately as prices are cut lower and lower. Of course, it may be possible for A
to maintain its price-cutting policy until B goes out of business, and
then raise prices again. But it will be a severe drain on A's financial
resources so long as the price war continues. And it seems unlikely that
exempt institutions like universities and hospitals, which are clamoring
for funds, will forego current income on the risk that they can drive out
a competitor after a lengthy price war.
Note, Colleges, Charities, and The Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851, 876
(1951).
48 Indeed, market theorists are still debating whether predatory pricing-lowering prices in an effort to drive competitors from the market with the
ultimate goal of gaining the monopolistic power to set prices even higher than
they were before the price cutting war began-has ever been employed even by
taxable competitors. Thomas W. Hazlett, Microsoft's Internet Exploration: Predatory or Competitive, 9 CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL'Y 29, 33 (1999).
"' Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17 at 1024 ("Nonprofit firms engage in tax-exempt business activity to provide funds to subsidize their primary activities.
Therefore they want to maximize expected profits.").
" The cost of predatory pricing is the profit lost during the period of time it
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tion precluded from being "exactly identical" to a taxable participant. The inability to distribute profit to its stewards will
prevent the nontaxable entity from being as efficient as a
taxable entity."' To make up for its lower efficiency (i.e., to
compensate the consumer for lower quality or quantity),52 the
nontaxable entity would be required to reduce prices to an
even greater extent than it would if it were as efficient as its
taxable competitor. As an alternative, the nontaxable participant could increase agency costs while offering reduced prices. 3 The financial value of tax exemption, otherwise available to subsidize the nontaxable entity's predatory behavior,

takes to force a competitor from the market. See supra note 47 and accompanying
text. To recoup that cost, the predatory actor would need to raise prices after its
other competitors have left the market and incur costs to prevent other competitors from reentering the market (without barriers, reentry is possible once the
predatory actor raises prices again). See Hazlett, supra note 48, at 32. Having
prevailed in the initial price war at significant cost, a charitable entity is unlikely
to have sufficient resources left to defend its monopoly through the erection of
further market barriers.
" Some economists, in arguing that the absence of UBIT might allow charities to engage in price-cutting, inexplicably assume away a charity's lower efficiency level. Their analysis assumes instead that nonprofits and for-profits are equally
efficient. See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr., Non-Profit Business and The Unrelated
Business Income Tax, in 13 TAx POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 57, 63-64 (assuming
that nonprofits are not disadvantaged by their form); Rose-Ackerman, supra note
17, at 1030 (assuming that nonprofits are no less efficient than for-profits).
2 "Charitable organizations are plagued by incentive problems. Nobody owns
the right to the profits and therefore no one has the spur to efficient performance
that the lure of profits creates." United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179 (7th Cir. 1999). "Of course, one would expect that when the profit motive is eliminated a price is paid in terms of incentives. For example, nonprofit firms might be expected to be slower in meeting increased demand and to be less efficient in their use of inputs than for-profit
firms." Hansmann, supra note 44, at 844.
"' Agency costs are incurred to eliminate waste and spoilage that result when
(as is always the case) an agent's interests are not perfectly aligned with those of
her principle. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1995). Thus, for example, in an employer/employee relationship, an
employer may incur certain costs (e.g., hiring more supervisors to enforce higher
level job performance, or instituting a bonus compensation plan) to eliminate the
naturally occurring divergence between the interests of principle and agent. Because of the lack of profit motives, charitable organizations are likely to have
higher agency costs.
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would be consumed by the higher costs or lower prices. At
best, the nontaxable entity would only break even, and its
profit-maximization goal would fail. The nontaxable entity
would simply be participating in an unprofitable endeavor. If,
instead, the nontaxable entity could participate in profit-seeking endeavors without risking its own existence (as it would in
a price war) or sacrificing its tax exemption to lower prices or
higher efficiency costs, we should expect that it would do so.
Thus, the nontaxable entity could garner more profit by not
undercutting prices (i.e., maintaining prices at the level
charged by taxable participants) in the particular industry54
but instead devoting some of the tax windfall to its higher
efficiency costs so that it comes close to being "exactly identical" to its taxable competitor. The nontaxable entity would
then earn only the same after tax yield as the taxable competitor. As a result, the nontaxable firm will share in the market
profit, rather than monopolize the industry or participate in
an unprofitable endeavor.5 5 In the alternative, the nontaxable
" "In fact, if tax-exempt firms have no special efficiency advantages in any
industry, one would expect them to seek to maximize returns by establishing
firms in a broad range of industries, thus earning close to a competitive return in
each one. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 1029.
" Hansmann, supra note 41, at 610-11.

[A] nonprofit firm that owns an unrelated business has an incentive to
expand that business slowly if at all. In this manner, the nonprofit
leaves undisturbed the price that prevails when only for-profit firms
compete, and thereby maximizes the difference between cost and sales
price. Nonprofits with substantial funds to invest-more than can be
accommodated with ease in a single market or industry without entering
on a scale, or expanding at a rate, sufficient to drive down prices-would have an incentive to spread those funds across a number of
markets or industries and invest on a small scale in each industry to
avoid disturbing existing price levels. Similarly, if a firm owned and
operated as an investment a nonprofit that generated large earnings--earnings large enough so that, if reinvested in the firm, they
would lead to a substantial increase in output and a consequent lowering
of industry price levels-the nonprofit would have an incentive to withdraw a large portion of those earnings from the firm and invest them
elsewhere. Such a strategy would assure the maximum rate of return on
investments in unrelated businesses. At the price level needed to cover
costs for a for-profit firm paying taxes, a tax-exempt firm could potentially earn pure profits at least equal to the amount of taxes that would
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entity might simply invest in one or more taxable participants
in various markets and thereby obtain a portion of the profit
garnered by those taxable participants. s6 From even a microeconomic sense, the consequences motivating the UBIT are
unlikely.
The validity of the concerns motivating UBIT are further
challenged by the emergence and continued growth of
Cyberspace. First, the ratio of cost to profit in Cyberspace is so
low, as compared to the ratio in the real world,5 7 that the
potential for individual wealth accumulation overwhelms any
motivation individuals might have to enter Cyberspace using
the nonprofit form. Indeed, judging by the continued infusion
of investor capital, Cyberspace is benefiting from the perception, if not reality, of huge profit potential.58 For the nonprof-

otherwise be assessed. Rapid increases in capacity through internal expansion would often reduce the price level and, hence, the rate of profit.
Id.
56 Charities are exempt from taxation on dividends. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998). But investing in the stock of taxable corporations would
not result in greater returns than engaging in the corporation's business directly
since the corporation will pay tax on earnings before distributing those earnings
to the charitable shareholder. See I.R.C. § 11 (1994).
" The United States Commerce Department provides the following anecdote:

The New York Times invested $350 million in its new printing press
. . . . Web content businesses requiring a much lower capital investment
than their print counterparts, lower the barrier to entry in this online
industry. With the Internet, the content of a newspaper or a magazine
does not have to be printed and delivered to news stands or doorsteps
across the city in order to be consumed-steps that add 30 to 40 percent
to the cost of the product. Instead, content delivered via the Internet can
be entered directly into a computer, stored digitally on a server and
appear directly on a reader's computer screen with a few simple commands the reader enters on the Web site . . . . The publisher's distribution costs include paying off the investment in the Web servers and
other technology . . . . Once the content has been created and stored,
there is little or no extra cost to send it to one reader or 1,000 readers.
Lynn Margherio, Dave Henry, Sandra Cooke, Sabrina Montes & Kent Hughes, The
Emerging Digital Economy, at 25 (1988) available at <http://www.ecommerce.gov/
ecomnews/emerging.htm> (visited Sept. 2, 2000).
58 In just the first quarter of 2000, venture capitalists invested $22.7 billion
in companies, the largest single portion of which ($17.05 billion) was in Internetrelated companies. Venture Capital Investments Increase 266% to 22.7 Billion in
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it form to rise to dominance in Cyberspace, even with the
advantage of tax exemption (that is, even in the absence of the
UBIT), individuals who conduct economic activity in
Cyberspace would have to forego that profit potential. The
likelihood of that happening in a capitalist world is perhaps
lower than words can express. The infusion of investor capital,
too, eliminates the feared consequence that without UBIT
charities can expand at a faster rate than taxable entities
since the nondistribution constraint effectively prevents charities from participating in the free-flowing capital markets. So
long as investors are clamoring to invest in and profit from
Cyberspace activity, charities are more likely to suffer a disadvantage, rather than an advantage, from tax exemption because the value and benefit of capital markets to taxable entities most likely far exceeds the value and benefit provided by
tax exemption to charities.
There is perhaps an even more fundamental reason why
UBIT is unnecessary, at best, in Cyberspace. The premise of
charitable hegemony that motivates UBIT is largely related to
the 20th century industrial marketplace model, potentially
controlled by malevolent participants who are able to own and
manipulate fixed tangible assets. Cyberspace, though, epitomizes a 21st century informational marketplace and it remains a very open question whether an informational marketplace is subject to the sort of monopolization thought prevented by UBIT.5 9 The premier asset of Cyberspace is intelli-

Q1

2000: Internet-Related Companies Capture the
Most Investments,
<http'//www.nvca.org/Vepress05_O4_00.htm> (visited Nov. 17, 2000).
" On the subject of new market place and relative power therein, the Commerce Department states:
The potential of e-commerce technologies to transform business practices
is evident in the new marketplaces that are developing online. These
important intermediaries have emerged rapidly in virtually all industries,
providing new places for buyers and sellers to meet, allowing a variety
of pricing schemes to flourish, altering the roles of traditional intermediaries, enabling complex transactions, and, by making vast amounts of
information available at very low costs, shifting the balance of power
among market participants.
United States Department of Commerce, Digital Economy 2000, at 16 (2000)
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gence-an unfixed, intangible asset. Already, the Supreme
Court has likened Cyberspace to a public place where content
is entitled to the highest form of First Amendment protection.6" It hardly seems possible, then, that the informational
assets of Cyberspace can be harnessed and monopolized by
any single entity, regardless of that entity's relative ability to
accumulate capital, and then used exclusively to that entity's
financial benefit.6 1
For the moment, though, the Code continues to accept as
true and likely the fears that motivated the enactment of the
UBIT. The sale of advertising space-"marketing audience--is one of two activities to which the Service has recently devoted particular attention with regard to UBIT.62 Moreover, the Service is currently addressing the application of
UBIT in Cyberspace.63 The next two sections implicitly accept

<http:/www.esa.doc.gov/de2000.pdf> (visited Nov. 2, 2000).
® Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
"No single organization controls any membership in the Web, nor is there
any single centralized point from which individual Web sites or services can be
blocked from the Web." Id. at 853 (quoting American Civil Liberties Union v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838 (1996)). Earlier, the lower court found that:
Such diversity of content on the Internet is possible because the Internet
provides an easy and inexpensive way for a speaker to reach a large
audience, potentially millions. The start-up and operating costs entailed
by communication on the Internet are significantly lower than those
associated with use of other forms of mass communication, such as television, radio, newspapers, and magazines. This enables operation of their
own Web sites not only by large companies such as Microsoft and Time
Warner but also by small not for profit groups.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 843.
' The other activity to which the Service has devoted attention vis-a-vis the
UBIT is the conduct of tours and travel programs by exempt organizations. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-7 (2000).
' Twice last year the Service indicated that it was considering the application
of UBIT to charitable activities conducted in Cyberspace and has called for public
comment on the issue. 2000-42 I.R.B. 385 (Oct. 16, 2000); Taxation of Tax-Exempt
Organizations' Income from Corporate Sponsorships, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,012, 11,015
(2000) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Mar. 1, 2000). In its first call
for public input, the Service asked:
The IRS and the Treasury Department are reviewing the application of
existing tax laws governing exempt organizations, including the UBIT
rules, to Internet activities. Comments are specifically requested on . . .
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the notion that a charity's tax-free conduct of an unrelated
trade or business is harmful to taxable entities and the market economy, but only for the sake of comparing the distinction between sponsorship and advertising revenues, and how
and whether that distinction should apply in Cyberspace.

III. THE TAXATION OF ADVERTISING AND SPONSORSHIP
The foregoing economic logic has never given pause to
Congress or the Service's efforts to "protect" taxable entities
from unfair competition. Those efforts have continued unimpeded' and have produced one of the definitional peculiarities with regard to the UBIT scheme. In the technical language of the Code, UBIT applies when a charity regularly
engages in an unrelated "trade or business." 5 In the late sixties, the Service began considering whether the sale of advertising space constitutes a trade or business." The Service
concluded, and Congress subsequently agreed, that the marketing of audience is always a trade or business even though
the space sold is within the context of some other media and,
indeed, without regard to editorial content or purpose of that
other media.6" Thus, an educational institution that publishes a journal solely to educate its beneficiaries and a company
that publishes a gossip magazine designed to entertain and
attract more readers are equally engaged in a trade or business when they sell advertising space to profit-seekers. The
sale of the space is analyzed separately from the context in

whether providing a link to a sponsor's Internet site is advertising within the meaning of section 513(i).

Id.
" See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.513-7 (2000) (applying UBIT to travel tours conducted by nonprofit organizations).
I.R.C. § 512(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
, For an historical overview of the Service's consideration of the U/BIT treatment of advertising revenues see William J. Lehrfeld, The Unfairness Doctrine:
Commercial Advertising Profits as Unrelated Business Income, 23 TAX LAW. 349,
351-352 (1970).
"' The conclusion was embodied in regulations proposed and issued in fimal
form in 1967. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 Fed. Reg. 5,993 (April 14,
1967); Notice of Final Rulemaking, 32 Fed. Reg. 17,657 (1967).
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which the space occurs and is thereby irrefutably considered a
trade or business." And, according to the Service and Congress, if the advertising is unrelated to the educational
institution's charitable mission, it has the potential to compete
unfairly with the gossip magazine.6 9
Certainly, the creation of advertising substance-i.e.,
marketing of persuasive speech-is normally thought of as a
trade or business without regard to the context in which the
speech occurs. If a charity engaged in the editorial process of
creating advertising copy, the conclusion that it was indeed
engaged in a trade or business would not challenge normal
understanding. But the marketing of audience, as opposed to
marketing of persuasive speech, is largely dependent upon the

' "In the statement of a type of per se rule, the soliciting, selling, and publishing of commercial ("consumer") advertising is an unrelated trade or business
even though the advertising is published in a periodical which contains editorial
matter related to the exempt purpose of the organization." Id. Lehrfeld, supra
note 66, at 355. The quoted statement is accurate only with regard to the determination that the sale of advertising is always a trade or business. The Supreme
Court later held that though the sale of advertising space is always a trade or
business by virtue of the regulations, it is not always unrelated and therefore
does not invariably lead to taxable income. United States v. American College of
Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
" The UBIT regulations require only that an activity have the potential to
compete with taxable activities. See Treas. Reg. 1.513-1(b) (2000) (referring to
activities which "present the sufficient likelihood of unfair competition" and thus
are within the policy of unrelated business income tax). It is also difficult to
conceive of advertising that is "related" to a charitable function, given the Supreme Court's imposition of a rather high bar in United States v. American College of Physicians. 475 U.S. 834 (1986). In that case, the Court found the advertising described in the following excerpt to be unrelated:
The Annals of Internal Medicine (Annals) [is] a highly regarded monthly
medical journal containing scholarly articles relevant to the practice of
internal medicine. Each issues of Annals contains advertisements for
pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment useful in the practice
of internal medicine, as well as notices of positions available in that
field. Respondent has a longstanding policy of accepting only advertisements containing information about the use of medical products, and
screens proffered advertisements for accuracy and relevance to internal
medicine.
Id. at 836. In an early informal setting, the Service opined that advertising dealing
with probate notices, service of process, and appointments of receivers appearing in
a daily law reporter would be related. Lehrfeld, supra note 66, at 356 n.26.
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creation of news, sports, information, and entertainment (i.e.,
"media") by persons having the specific intent to attract marketeers of persuasive speech.7" The media, by which audience
is obtained and then marketed, is not created primarily to
benefit an already existing audience. In the business of marketing audience, media is created specifically to generate,
maintain, and increase audience and thereby better attract
marketeers of persuasive speech. Competition is manifested in
the search for new and even more creative means of generating audience. The key and rather obvious difference with regard to charities is that the purpose of charitable media is
speaking to or benefiting an already existing audience - one
composed of charitable beneficiaries whose interests are, at
least with regard to any particular charity, assumed to be
static and unchanging. The content of that media is therefore
unchanging and not at all responsive to evolving tastes, fads,
and styles in a constant effort to generate, maintain, and
increase audience. Indeed, charitable media assumes that the
audience's interests are entirely unchanging. To conclude,
first, that the marketing of audience is always a trade or business makes no sense, particularly since charitable media is
relatively devoid of profit potential.7 ' To further assert that
70 The marketing of audience is, to a much lesser but still significant degree,

also dependent upon the ownership of space. Thus, an owner of a billboard along
a highly traveled thoroughfare will have better success selling advertising space
than an owner of a billboard along a little traveled thoroughfare.
71 There are, of course, glaring exceptions such as NCAA sporting events. The
statutory consideration of the term "trade or business" as it relates to advertising
relies upon objective indications that an entity is actually seeking profit. Those
objective indications are necessary to find that an activity is a trade or business.
For example, I.R.C. § 513(c) states, "where an activity carried on for profit constitutes an unrelated trade or business, no part of such trade or business shall be
excluded from such classification merely because it does not result in profit."
I.R.C. § 513(c). The regulations, though, suggest that an entity need only be seeking "income" for an activity to be considered a trade or business: "Accordingly, for
purposes of section 513 the term 'trade or business' has the same meaning it has
in section 162, and generally includes any activity carried on for the production of
income from the sale of goods or performance of services." Treas. Reg. § 1.1832(b)(1)-(9) (2000). But in yet another twist, the definition of "trade or business" as
used in I.R.C. § 162 (which definition is adopted for purposes of the UBIT) is
further elaborated on in Treasury Regulation 1.183-2. That regulation lists nine
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the static and unresponsive media-unresponsive to tastes
and styles, that is 72 -produced by charities is potentially
"competitive" is obviously even more nonsensical since such
media can hardly garner the audience necessary to siphon
advertising revenues from taxable media.
At first, some in the Treasury Department resisted the
notion that the marketing of audience could be viewed as a
"trade or business" regardless of the nature of the media providing access to that marketed audience. 73 They adhered, essentially, to the more global notion, discussed above, that the
sale of advertising space was essentially the marketing of the
media that generated and attracted audience. If the media
itself was related to the charitable goal, then any advertising
contained therein did not give rise to unrelated business income.7 4 That position was obviously, though not explicitly,
based more on the lack of competitive impact on taxable media, than on the notion that advertisement appearing in charitable media was ipso facto related to a charitable purpose. An
advertisement for an analgesic, for example, is generally unrelated to the educational goals of a law review in which it may
be found, but neither is it likely to have an impact on the sale
of advertising space by publishers of TV Guide. This rather
obvious logic failed though, and opponents within and outside
of the Treasury Department were finally silenced when the
Supreme Court labeled the taxation of advertisement regard-

factors by which to distinguish a trade or business (expenses of which are fully
deductible) from a "hobby" (expenses of which are deductible only to the extent of
income derived from such activity). Id. Every one of the nine factors focuses on
objective facts that indicate a search for profit, not just income. Indeed, the discussion of each factor uses the term "profit." Id.
7 One need only compare any law review article appearing in this publication
with any law review article appearing in a ten year old issue of this publication
to see that the writing style (admittedly relatively dry and certainly academic)
has intentionally and perhaps necessarily remained constant over the years.
"' Lehrfeld, supra note 66, at 351-352 (discussing conflict between Internal
Revenue Service's Tax Ruling Division, whose approach would tax revenues from
sale of advertising revenue without regard to editorial content, and Service's Office of Chief Counsel, which opposed that approach).
74 Id.
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5 but nevertheless upless of media context "revolutionary,""
held it as a valid exercise of executive and legislative prerogative.76
Neither the Treasury regulations nor I.R.C. § 513(c) precisely defined the term, "advertisement," suggesting that its
meaning was self-evident. In its 1991 "Cotton Bowl" ruling,
the Service in effect applied an intuitive definition, ruling that
the Cotton Bowl Athletic Association (CBAA) earned unrelated
business income when it entered into a "sponsorship" agreement with the Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil).7 7 In essence,
the arrangement required CBAA to prominently display
Mobil's logo in all of CBAA's promotional material, as well as
on and around the football field where CBAA's football game
was to be played and indeed on every player's jersey.7" The
CBAA also agreed to provide space for Mobil's more stereotypical advertisements." The Service's subsequent determina-

United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 839 (1986),
76 Id.

at 850. Chief Justice Berger opined that exempting from taxation rev-

enues derived from advertising appearing in publications related solely to the
publisher's exempt purpose would be appropriate, but that the Service's contrary
approach was "permissible." Id. at 850 (Burger, J. concurring).
" Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991).
Id. The ruling released by the Service was edited almost to the point of
being nonsensical, but the relevant facts were subsequently reported in trade
journals. See Paul Streckfus, A Glimpse of Mobil-Cotton Bowl Contract Provisions,
55 TAX NoTEs 447 (1992) (reporting particular provisions of contract between
CBAA and Mobil Oil); Amy Forsythe, Implications of The Cotton Bowl Ruling on
The Exempt Status of Intercollegiate Athletic Organizations 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REv. 933, 933 (1992) (reporting that Mobil Oil paid CBAA $1.5 million under contract).
"9 Streckfus, supra note 78 at 447.
For anyone not familiar with the Mobil Cotton Bowl, here is what you
see and hear when you turn on your television set New Year's Day.
First, you are told you will be watching the "Mobil Cotton Bowl Classic."
Then, as the announcers talk about the teams, you are shown the football field, with the name of the game-Mobil Cotton Bowl Classic--emblazoned on the 50-yard line, the Mobil logo at each 30-yard line, and
the name "Mobil Cotton Bowl" filling each end zone. Each player has a
patch on his uniform saying "Mobil Cotton Bowl Classic." Each time the
game score is flashed on the screen it is accompanied by the heading,
Mobil Cotton Bowl. In case there is anyone who doesn't know who or
what Mobil is, regular ads, presumably purchased from NBC, extol the
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tion that the payment made to CBAA was entirely for advertising and thus taxable as unrelated business income revolved
around the idea that CBAA was providing a "substantial return benefit." ° From this, the Service concluded that CBAA's
receipt of payment implicated the unfair competition rationale
of the UBIT. The Achilles heel, though, of the Service's approach was its failure to articulate a reasoned definition of the
term "advertisement."
Indeed, such an articulation was incumbent on the Service once it decided to ignore the formalistic label the parties
applied to the arrangement (i.e., "sponsorship")' and to apply
UBIT principles according to the perceived economic substance-a substance the Service rightly determined to be marketing communication designed to increase sales. Articulating
a substantive definition would have necessarily defended the
notion implicit in the Service's findings that the accommodations derived from Mobil's payment to CBAA, although labeled
"sponsorship," would have otherwise been obtained from taxable media.
A subsequent consequence of the Service's failure to articulate the meaning of "advertisement" was that its substantively correct determination equating sponsorship with advertise-

virtues of Mobil products during each advertising break.
Paul Streckfus, IRS' Pre-Inaugural Gift For Charities, 58 TAx NoTES 384, 384
(1993).
" Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991). Five months later, the Service
provided a more elaborate statement of its analysis:
Payments an exempt organization receives from donors are nontaxable
contributions if there is no expectation that the organization will provide
a substantial return benefit. Mere acknowledgement or recognition of a
corporate contributor as a benefactor normally is incidental to the receipt
of a contribution and is not of sufficient benefit to give rise to unrelated
trade or business income. However, where an exempt organization performs valuable advertising, marketing, and similar services, on a quid
pro quo basis, for the corporate sponsor, payments made to an exempt
organization are not contributions to the exempt organization, and questions of unrelated trade or business arise.
I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B. 51 (Feb. 2, 1992) (emphasis added).
"i For a discussion of early conceptualizations of "sponsorship," see supra note
10 and accompanying text.
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ment (and taxing both) became subject to the regulatory
equivalent of political "spin." Exempt organizations weighed in
with numerous objections which, though valid on some secondary levels, were nevertheless unrelated to the primary question of whether that which Mobil obtained via its payment to
CBAA could and would have otherwise been obtained from
taxable media. 2 The ultimate consequence was that the Service left itself without objectively neutral support for what was
an empirically correct, though only intuitively expressed, conclusion. The unopposed universal condemnation, though largely unprincipled and indeed unresponsive to the substantive
issue, left the entire issue to be decided on the basis of political expediency rather than principled tax theory (however
debatable that theory may have been).
Once the issue moved from the realm of principled tax
policy to simple politics,"3 the promulgation of the original

' The Cotton Bowl Athletic Association, whose views were said to be representative of the nearly 300 comments submitted to the Service in opposition to its
early position, accused the Service of engaging in a "lark and a frolic, writing tax
law, not interpreting technical provisions." Streckfus, supra note 79, at 385. CBAA
went on to implicitly admit the correctness of the Service's finding that CBAA
was marketing a product not simply accepting a nontaxable donation. "[Tihe IRS
needs to face the reality today, that if corporations make substantial donations to
tax-exempt organizations, they want something other than a pat-on-the-back in
return." Cynthia G. Farbman, Forced To Be A Fan: An Analysis and History of
the IRS's Proposed Regulations Regarding Corporate Sponsorship, 2 SPORTS LAW.
J. 53, 61 (1995).
" One anecdotal legend of the entire process holds that a prominent attorney
was overheard to brag, "as long as there were three Texans (the state where the
Cotton Bowl is played) on the House Ways and Means Committee, the Cotton
Bowl would never be taxed." Streckfus, supra note 79, at 385. In a more empirical vein, one commentator documents the growth and political influence of the
charitable community:
[Tihe [charitable] community demands "durable" tax subsidies as it
jealously guards its present tax subsidies and urges the legislature to
resist the application of doctrinally sound tax policy that might lessen
the value of such subsidies. Finally, the rhetorical force of the new institutional role of the charitable community insures that any debate concerning the tax treatment of charitable organizations is cast in broad
generalities and does not delve into the merits of the continued subsidy.
This means that legislators need not evaluate each piece of pro-charity
legislation. It is sufficient that the legislation is labeled "good for chari-
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proposed regulations and the subsequent enactment of I.R.C.
§ 513(i) became a fait accompli, particularly in light of the taxable media's uncharacteristic abstention from the debate.84
I.R.C. § 513(i) effectively defined advertisement in a manner
excluding from taxation a certain form of marketing communication that would otherwise be purchased from taxable media.
Revenues from "qualified sponsorship," defined as the unlimited display of a profit-seeker's brand name or logo, and even
the unlimited display or distribution of the profit-seeker's
products, were made nontaxable. 5 Revenues from advertisements, generally defined as qualitative messages regarding
the profit-seeker or its products, or inducements to buy, were
explicitly distinguished from sponsorship revenues and thus
made presumptively taxable.8 6 The Service dutifully followed
the enactment of I.R.C. § 513(i) by issuing revised proposed
regulations that, quite appropriately, simply adopt the distinction mandated by Congress insofar as sponsorship and advertising are concerned. 7

ty."
Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organizations Influence Federal Tax Policy:
"Rent-Seeking" Charities or Virtuous Politicians? 1996 WIs. L. REv. 971, 977.
" The small business sector, represented by various trade organizations and
indeed the United States Small Business Administration (SBA) is the primary
watchdog and whistleblower with regard to noncharitable business activities conducted by exempt organizations. See, e.g., Testimony of Russell Orban, Assistant
Chief Counsel for Tax Policy Office of Advocacy U.S. Small Business Administration Before Internal Revenue Service Panel on Unrelated Business Income Tax
February 10, 1999, at <httpJ/www.sba.gov/advo/laws/commentsfubit.html> (visited
Nov. 17, 2000); Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of The House Committee on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987). Henry Hansmann, Unfair Competition and The Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605, 605 (1989) ("There has recently been considerable agitation from the business community, and particularly from small businesses, against unfair competition from nonprofit firms."). Id. Inexplicably, though, the
small business community did not take an active role with regard to the Service's
efforts to tax revenues from sponsorship and advertisements.
85 I.R.C. § 513(i)(1), supra note 28.
S6 Id.
87 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,012 (March
1, 2000). Nontaxable sponsorship includes the display of:
logos and slogans that do not contain qualitative or comparative descrip-
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IV. THE SCIENCE OF MARKETING COMMUNICATION AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF TIME AND PLACE

The anomaly in the law-that sponsorship revenues are
not taxed though we may intuitively conclude that profit-seekers would otherwise pay taxable media for marketing communication space-results from an apparently intentional decision to ignore the science of marketing communication. 8 Ultimately, marketing communication focuses on the goal of generating and maintaining repeat consumer purchasing - a
result referred to in the marketing industry as "brand loyalty."89 The exact language by which that goal is achieved is

rather a secondary concern. Hence, sponsorship is viewed as a
form of marketing communication, though it seeks brand loyalty without the explicit inducements characteristic of stereotypical advertisement.' Though both methods are intended

tions of the payor's products, services, facilities or company; a list of the
payor's locations, telephone numbers, or Internet address; value- neutral
descriptions, including displays or visual depictions, of the payor's product-line or services; and the payor's brand or trade names and product
or service listings. Logos or slogans that are an established part of a
payor's identity are not considered to contain qualitative or comparative
descriptions. Mere display or distribution, whether for free or remuneration, of a payor's product by the payor or the exempt organization to the
general public at the sponsored activity is not considered an inducement
to purchase, sell or use the payor's product for purposes of this section
and, thus, will not affect the determination of whether a payment is a
qualified sponsorship payment.
Id. Although I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(A) excludes any mention of "slogans" as qualified
sponsorship, the Conference Committee states, "as further clarification, the conferees intend that, as provided under Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.513-4 [i.e., the original proposed regulations], the use of promotional logos or slogans that are an established
part of the sponsor's identity would not, by itself, constitute advertising." H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 105-220, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. at 476, reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1129, 1288.
" See Zimmerman, supra note 18. A Congressional Research Service report
was issued prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 513(i), informing Congress, inter
alia, that charitable media competes with taxable media when charitable media
sells sponsorship space. Id.
9 See Timothy Joyce, The Advertising Process, in How ADVERTISING WORKS
11, 13 (1998).
' James Crimmins & Martin Horn, Sponsorship: From Management Ego Trip
to Marketing Success, J. OF ADVERTISING REs., July/August 1996 at 11. The au-
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to achieve the same result-brand loyalty-tax law pretends as
though the former does not take revenues from taxable media
and therefore does not implicate UBIT.
Conventional marketing communication theory holds that
consumer purchasing and brand loyalty is thought to occur
through a four-step process: awareness, interest, desire, and
action (AIDA)." Under this model, marketing communication
plays an informational role (making a consumer aware of a
particular brand) as well as a persuasive role (creating within
the consumer an interest in and desire for the brand).92
Though there is debate concerning the role and effectiveness
of persuasion in generating brand loyalty, academicians clearly and quite naturally agree that generating awareness is the
first and most indispensable part of the process.9 3 The conthors provide an interesting description of the persuasive effects of sponsorship:
Sponsorship is a means of persuasion that is fundamentally different
from traditional advertising. Sponsorship persuades indirectly. Sponsorship does not try to change perceptions of the brand in frontal assault.
Rather, sponsorship improves the perception of the brand by flanking our
beliefs about the brand and linking the brand to an event or organization that the target audience already values highly . . . . Consider the
case of the consumer who believes that all oil companies are greedy
despoilers of the environment and who also believes that Dr. Jane
Goodall is doing heroic work preserving the natural habitat of chimpanzees. Our consumer then learns there is a close link between Conoco Oil
Company and Dr. Jane Goodall . . . . The link between the lowly valued
oil company and the highly valued heroine creates an imbalance that
can be brought back into balance by lowering the opinion of Jane
Goodall or raising the opinion of Conoco Oil Company. Since highly valued objects in our value system are often more central and more resistant to change then our brand beliefs, our consumer is likely to conclude
that Conoco may not be quite as bad as the rest of the oil companies.
Id. at 12.
9" Andrew S.C.
Ehrenberg, Repetitive Advertising and the Consumer, How
ADVERTISING WORKS: THE ROLE OF RESEARCH 63, 67 (John Philips Jones ed.,
1998).
92

Id.

Compare id. at 79 (concluding that advertisement is effective only to extent
it informs, but not to extent it seeks to persuade) with John Philip Jones, Is Advertisement Still Salesmanship?, in How ADVERTISING WORKS: THE ROLE OF RESEARCH 83, 87-93 (John Philip Jones ed., 1998) (concluding that advertisement is
effective in informative and well as persuasive role, but implicitly conceding that
generating awareness is necessary precondition to any effect).
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sumer must first be made aware of the product's existence,
before she is ultimately persuaded to purchase, and continue
purchasing the product to the exclusion of all others. Thus, regardless of the role of persuasion, marketing communication is
deemed effective only to the extent it creates "top-of-mindawareness" of the brand (TOMAB). 9 4 That is, if a consumer
thinks of a particular brand in conjunction with her need for
and decision to purchase a product, without any prompting or
other clues, the particular brand enjoys TOMAB and will more
likely be purchased than other brands.9" The informational
function of marketing communication, then, is designed to
create TOMAB, an indispensable precursor to building brand
loyalty.
Sponsorship, as a form of marketing communication, is a
relatively recent phenomenon.' Although at one time it was
viewed as a philanthropic act, sponsorship is now viewed as a
form of "hard-nosed" marketing.9 7 The significant facts, inso-

Arch G. Woodside & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Effects of Consumer Awareness of
Brand Advertising on Preference, 25 J. ADVERTISING RES. 41 (1985).
' Arch G. Woodside, MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IMAGE AND LINKAGE
ADVERTISING 19 (1996). "[Tjhe higher the position of a brand in a consumer's
mind as measured by unaided recall, the higher the purchase intention and the
higher the relative purchase of the brand." Id.
94 Meenaghan, supra note 10, at 3. "From relatively limited activity in the
late 1960's and early 1970's [commercial sponsorship] has grown substantially
over the last three decades." Id.
' Id. at 10. "A donation mentality has been replaced by hard-nosed commercialism that is indicated by the current obsession with legal agreements, discussions on property rights and a focus on the precise returns for such investment."
Id. The popular press, too, recognizes sponsorship's evolution from philanthropy to
commercialism:
In the past, being a benefactor to the arts was an act limited to the
wealthy. But modern day companies, far from being modern Medicis and
Tates, take a more business-like approach to arts sponsorship. Rather
than pure donations, they regard it as an important part of brand building and look for suitable returns. They expect to achieve greater recognition in the market, and improve their standing with core customers by
building a rapport through the art they choose.
Emiko Terazono, Emphasis Put On Cultural Links: Altruism Should be Allied With
Marketing If Sponsorship is Not to Miss The Point, FINANCIAL TIMES (London),
June 2, 2000, at 3.
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far as the theory of UBIT is concerned, are that sponsorship is
the fastest growing form of marketing communication, consuming an ever-increasing size of world-wide corporate advertising budgets,9 8 and exempt organizations (though they do
not use the lingo of marketing theorists) are offering space in
their media as an effective way to build brand awareness.9 9
In addition, though, sponsorships are viewed as a form of
persuasion, even in the absence of explicit requests to buy or
assertions of superiority relative to other brands."° Thus,
contrary to tax law's implicit conclusion otherwise, the solicitation and receipt of sponsorship revenues rather definitively
implicate the fears underlying the UBIT. In effect, when charitable media solicits and receives sponsorship revenues, it is
selling the same commodity, intangible though it may be,
available from taxable media-brand awareness and persuasion.
The anomaly-that sponsorship revenues are not to be
equated with advertising revenues and therefore taxed-is dis-

9" The boom in sponsorships is a worldwide phenomenon, as noted in the following discussion:
Increased investment in sponsorship, while initially a feature of mature
Western economies, is now evident on a global basis. The scale of worldwide growth in sponsorship ...
increased from $2 billion in 1984 to
$16.6 billion in 1996. Europe and North America continue to dominate
the world sponsorship market accounting in 1996 for 33.2 percent and
33.3 percent respectively, but other markets particularly in Australia and
Asia have grown significantly.
Meenaghan, supra note 10, at 5. Other international scholars note sponsorship's
growing market share, relative to advertising and other forms of marketing communications: "During the last decade, sponsorship spending in North America has
increased at an average rate of 20 percent annually as compared to 5.5 percent
and 7.6 percent for advertising and sales promotion respectively." Alain d'Astous &
Pierre Bitz, Consumer Evaluations of Sponsorship Programmes, 12 EuR. J. MARKETING 6, 6 (1995).
See, e.g., Richard L. Clarke, The Value of Sponsorship, HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, June 1, 2000, at 16 (Healthcare Financial Management is
official publication of Healthcare Financial Management Association, tax-exempt
organization) ("ITihe act of sponsoring an event or activity with a particular audience is widely recognized as an effective way to make audience aware of the
sponsor's capabilities, products, or services.").
"®See supra note 90.
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guised somewhat, and indeed the notion that exempting sponsorship revenues should have no effect on taxable media is
made a bit less implausible, by requiring that the process of
sponsorship be kept separate in time and place from the process of advertisement. So long as language deemed "sponsorship" is displayed or uttered separately from stereotypical
advertisement, the Code indulges a false distinction-that the
latter is marketing communication while the former is not.
Consider the following example:
A state university conducts a well-attended, three-day
track and field event each spring at an outdoor athletic
facility owned by the university. The athletic facility is
bounded on all sides by streets owned by the city. All of
the approximately 85,000 fans attending the event over
the three-day period must use one of the city streets to
get to and leave the track and field event. In exchange
for $50,000, the university agrees to display the logo
and products of "Cola," a well known soft drink maker.
The manufacturer's logo and products are on display at
and distributed from approximately 30 different places
throughout the facility. In addition, the logo is affixed to
the shirts and warm-up suits of all participants. The
university sells the television rights to the event to a
national broadcaster. In addition to buying stereotypical
advertising time from the broadcaster, the cola manufacturer purchases $20,000 worth of billboard space on the
four streets bordering the facility and displays stereotypical advertisement on each billboard, and for $40,000
it hires a blimp displaying Cola's logo and the statement, "Cola taste better than Un-Cola," to fly over the
facility.
Clearly, the display of the manufacturer's logo and the distribution of its product will generate or reinforce brand awareness,
and that brand awareness may be expected to increase or
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maintain consumer purchasing of that brand. 1 ' Likewise, the
stereotypical advertisement posted on billboards just outside
the athletic facility, and that purchased from the broadcaster
and the blimp owner generate brand awareness and are intended to persuade, though the communication hopes to do so
explicitly.° 2 But since the sponsorship language is kept separate from the advertising language, the law pretends they are
different. Although the revenues paid to the billboard owners
and the blimp owner are taxable, the law exempts the $50,000
received in exchange for displaying and distributing the
manufacturer's logo and products as part of the charitable
media's time and space. The sponsorship obtained from the
state university is obviously part and parcel of an overall marketing campaign, but the law will not associate the sponsorship
with the advertisement so long as stereotypical advertisement
is not presented contemporaneously (i.e., at the same time and
place). 0 3 The law merely requires that the profit seeker await
"'
0

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
The research literature indicates that to get the most of its sponsorship

dollar, a profit-seeker must also engage in stereotypical advertising designed to
make the consumer aware that it is, indeed, a sponsor. Crimmins & Thorn, supra
note 90, at 13.
Sponsorship, unlike advertising, involves leverage. Buying an association
is only the starting point . . . [S]ponsorship without support is like buying advertisement space then having nothing to show. You end up with
a blank screen or empty page. If sponsorship is to be effective it must
be supported by other marketing components such as advertising, promotion, point-of-sale, on-pack signage and production of merchandise.
Des Thwaites, Rafael Aguilar-Manjarrez & Callum Kidd, Sports sponsorship development in leading Canadian Companies: issues & trends, 17 INTL. J. ADVERTISING
29, 35 (1998) (citations omitted). Does this mean that charitable media really is
selling something different from taxable media and that the ultimate goal-brand
loyalty-is available only from taxable stereotypical advertisement? Probably not, as
the data show that when persons who value a particular charitable event are made
aware of a sponsor's association with that event, they increase their purchasing of
the sponsor's brand. Crimmins & Horn, supra note 90, at 17 (showing 60 percent
of U.S. adult population indicate that they try to buy company's products if company supports Olympics). Awareness and persuasion, though, can be generated simply
from the display of a company's logo at the event itself, not just from follow-up
advertising. Id. (reporting that 82 percent of adults actually attending untelevised
charitable event--Chicago Gospel Festival-said they would be more likely to buy
sponsor's brand).
103 In a reversal of the original proposed regulations, the revised proposed

20001

CHARITABLE CYBERSPACE

some other time or place (however close it may be to the time
and place at which sponsorship is presented) if the sponsorship
revenues are to avoid taxation."°4 Sponsorship revenues will
never be taxed, even if the sponsorship communication is logically associated with separately presented advertising communication and, indeed, even if that advertisement is separately
presented within the same charitable media or place as the
sponsorship communication0' Thus, although sponsorship
and stereotypical advertisement have identical effects-increasing or maintaining brand loyalty-the law exempts revenues
from the former and will not impute those revenues to the
latter, so long as the former is kept at a distance from the
latter.
The enforcement of spatial and nonspatial distance between sponsorship and stereotypical advertisement, then, creates plausibility with regard to the notion that sponsorship
revenues do not infringe upon revenues that would otherwise
be paid to taxable media. In the real world, of course, it is a
simple matter to observe and enforce that distance and thereby
to maintain the plausibility of the tax distinction between the
two marketing processes. The challenge presented by the emergence of Cyberspace, though, is that time and place are irrelevant, and distance is compressed to approximately one-tenth of
one second "travel" time."° The consumer who views a profitseeker's sponsorship in Cyberspace need not await some other
time and place to view the profit-seeker's explicit inducement,
regulations eliminate the "tainting rule" that rendered revenues from sponsorships
taxable if, within the same media, profit-seekers also presented stereotypical advertisement related to the sponsorship message. Compare Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.513-4(c)(2) (original proposed regulations), 58 Fed. Reg. 5,687, 5,690 (1993)
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,012-14 (March 1, 2000)

(eliminating "tainting rule"). Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg.
11,1012, 11,014 (proposed Mar. 1, 2000). On the other hand, a "single message
that contains both advertising and an acknowledgement [i.e., sponsorship] is advertising." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iv), 65 Fed. Reg. 11,012, 11,017 (2000).
Thus, so long as sponsorship language is kept separate from advertising language,
the revenues attributable to sponsorship will not be taxed.
104 Id.
/d.
I05
'o

See supra note 38.
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particularly if that .sponsorship is presented via a banner
hyperlinked to the profit-seeker's web page containing an advertisement. The nature of Cyberspace, then, necessarily challenges the basis supporting the plausibility of tax law's distinction between sponsorship and advertisement.
V. LEGAL FICTION MEETS VIRTUAL REALITY

Suppose that in the real world, the state university, discussed in the preceding part, entered into an agreement whereby a soft-drink manufacturer was allowed to post a placard
measuring five feet by five feet at the university's track and
field event. The placard is posted on the side of a building on
the grounds of the track and field facility and contains the
name "Coca-Cola," painted in red and white colors, but nothing
more. Directly behind the first placard, though, is another
placard which says "In a national survey, two out of three respondents said Coke is better than Pepsi," and any person in
attendance can turn the first placard over to read the second.
Or better yet, suppose the placard is actually a door leading to
a room in the building in which an audience member, having
taken the affirmative step to enter, can read about Coke's superior qualities relative to other soft-drinks and can even make
purchases.
As a very technical matter, we might argue that the stereotypical advertisement appearing on the second placard, and the
room from which an audience member can obtain more commercial propaganda and make purchases are at separate places
from the sign which says only "Coca-Cola," and, therefore, do
not render revenues paid for the right to post the first placard
taxable." 7 But in so concluding, we clearly expose the absur-

," The revised proposed regulations make two assertions that would support
this statement. First, a sponsorship communication will not result in unrelated
taxable income if that regulation is separate from other marketing communication
constituting advertisement, even if that other communication appears in the same
media as the sponsorship. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,012-14
(proposed Mar. 1, 2000) (discussing rejection of "tainting rle" under which all
marketing communication related to any advertisement appearing in charitable
media, even if marketing communication is sponsorship, would be taxable as ad-
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dity of our rule. The rule relies upon a distinction that makes
no difference, particularly if in our hypothetical real world it is
the norm rather than the exception that placards are merely a
first step to another placard containing more information or to
a separate room also containing more information. In the alternative, we might view the matter more realistically and conclude that the first placard is so indisputably connected to the
second, or to the room, that it is part and parcel of the second
placard or room, and therefore that the payment made to post
the original placard should be taxable. 8
But, then, suppose that our hypothetical real world depended for its existence on the here and now, and that all other
time and place was intentionally excluded. That is, in our hypothetical real world, everything is meant to be right here and
right now. A rule of law that depended on the enforcement of
separate time and place would either make no sense at all (i.e.,
the desired goal of such a rule would be completely unattainable), or would necessarily alter the manner in which those
who must comply with the law interact in and with that world.
Cyberspace presents the exact issues raised in the foregoing hypothetical real world. In fact, Cyberspace is the hypothetical real world. 19 The revised proposed regulations, on

vertisement). Second, a single marketing communication that contained both sponsorship and advertisement will be taxed as advertisement:
A single message that contains both advertising and an acknowledgment
is advertising. This section does not apply to activities conducted by a
payor on its own. For example, if a payor purchases broadcast time from
a television station to advertise its products during commercial breaks in
a sponsored program, the exempt organization's activities are not thereby
converted to advertising.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 11,012, 11,017 (proposed Mar. 1,
2000).
" The revised proposed regulations do not explain precisely how far apart a
sponsorship must be from a related advertisement in order that the two not be
considered a single message.
109 "The Internet removes barriers of time and geography, creating a virtual 24
X 7 world." Karl Frieden, CYBERTAXATION at 8 (2000). "The Web has the facility
for individuals or organisations to communicate directly with one another, regardless of distance or time." Kuen-Hee Ju-Pak, Content dimensions of web advertising: a cross-national comparison, 18 INT'L. J. ADVERTISING 207, 210 (1999).
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the other hand, are grounded solely in the real world and intentionally exclude any mention of virtual reality.11 ° In
Cyberspace, the closest equivalent to our hypothetical real
world placard is a banner. Normally, banners contain
hyperlinked pixel (tiny dots which form a picture)... that,
when clicked on, cause another web page to be displayed on the
viewer's monitor. Hence, the banner is like our hypothetical
real world placard, behind or through which lies more information. The Service has opined, in a setting much less formal
than the revised proposed regulations, that if a moving banner
contains pure sponsorship but is linked to stereotypical advertisement, the connection to the advertisement will cause the
banner to be considered advertisement 1 2 and any revenues
paid to place the banner will be potentially taxed as UBIT. On
the other hand, according to preliminary opinions, a non-moving or "static" banner containing sponsorship will not be
deemed advertisement even though it, too, is linked to a web
page containing advertisement.'11 In yet another try, the Service has suggested that perhaps the animated nature of the
banner is not determinative, but that if the banner is linked to
a web page at which a commercial transaction may be complet-

1'

"These proposed regulations do not specifically address the Internet activ-

ities of exempt organizations. However, the IRS and the Treasury Department are
reviewing the application of existing tax laws governing exempt organizations,
including the UBIT rules, to Internet activities." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
65 Fed. Reg. at 11,015 (proposed Mar. 1, 2000).
.. Kuen-Hee Ju-Pak, supra note 109, at 216 (defining banners as "small byper-linked pixel displays on a public web site.").
11 "A link will retain the passive character associated with corporate sponsorship while a moving banner is more likely to be considered to be advertising."
Cheryl Chasin et al., Tax Exempt Organizations and World Wide Web Fundraising
and Advertising on the Internet, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPr ORGANIZATION CPE TEXT FOR FY 2000, 120, 134 (1999) available via Westlaw at 99 TNT
169-20. In an earlier iteration of the rule, the Service stated somewhat confusingly, that "if it is an active or passive placard, or a running banner and income is
being derived, it is advertising. If the Web page shows merely a displayed link,
then it may not be advertising. . . ." Donna Moore & Robert Harper, Internet
Service Providers Exemption Issues Under IRC 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(12), ExEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CPE TEXT FOR FY 1999, chap. C, at 119 (1998) available via
Westlaw at 98 TNT 156-17.
113 Id.
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ed, the banner will constitute advertisement and the revenues
derived from the placement of the banner will be taxable.114 If
nothing else, these literal stops and starts indicate the difficulty of clinging to the idea of spatial and non-spatial distance as
the distinction between sponsorship and advertisement in
Cyberspace.
Before addressing the main issue of Cyberspace time and
place, it is helpful to consider some of the demographics of
Cyberspace. First, Cyberspace is increasingly populated by
"seekers" rather than "browsers. " 115 The former group is

thought to consist of Web users who know rather precisely
what they want and, therefore, navigate through Cyberspace to
web pages that are responsive to their wants. As a general
proposition, seekers do not click on banners and other Web
advertising."' Browsers, on the other hand, are relatively
One author summarizes the Service's apparent backing-off from the distinc-

11

tion between static and animated banners and instead focuses on what is accessed via the banner:
Indeed the IRS appears to have evolved in its analysis based upon recent statements by IRS officials. Specifically, an IRS official acknowledged informally that links to the main page of an exempt organization's
sponsors will probably not be considered advertising, even if the link
contains decorative effects, such as moving or spinning. Reportedly the
official . . . went on to say that if the exempt organization's acknowledgement contains a link to a Web page where business transactions could take place, the acknowledgement, whether static or otherwise,
will be deemed to be advertising for tax purposes.
Cynthia F. Reaves & Jeffrey Bennett, UBIT.COM?: Can The Old Laws Apply In
The New Cyber Frontier, 27 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 251, 253-54 (2000).
11. David R. Fortin, "New and Improved!" Advertising in Cyberspace: Using
Conduits to Access Browsers and Seekers, ADVERTISING AND THE WORLD WIDE
WEB at 63, 65 (David W. Schumann & Esther Thorson eds. 1999).
116

The reasons for the falling click-through rates are relatively simple.
Internet users are becoming more discriminating. They are generally not
using the Internet as entertainment (like most TV, the easiest comparable), but rather as a tool to gather information, communicate, etc. Taking time out from whatever task is being pursued to click on an ad is
the exception, not part of the typical user's game plan. Consumers who
were once "surfers" are evolving into "searchers." The newness of the
Web has also worn off, causing consumers to be less fascinated by advertising.
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new to Cyberspace and are thus still fascinated by the whole
concept. Browsers are more likely to click on hypertext and
thus be transported willy-nilly throughout Cyberspace. 117 In
any event, the "click-through" rate, the average percentage of
banners viewed that are actually clicked on, has consistently
fallen from a high of around 10% to a present low of about
.04%."'s As a general matter, then, banners rarely induce a
web user to "travel" to a Web page different from the page the
user is already viewing.
Despite the evolution of Cyberspace inhabitants from
browsers to seekers, and the precipitously falling click-through

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, The e-Marketing Report, 22 (May 2000), <http://www.
a176.g.akamai.net/7/176/770/03614ac390dcc9/www.msdw.com/techresearch/emarketing
/emarketing.pdf> (visited Nov. 15, 2000).
',
Fortin, supra note 115. The author provides the following informative summary, similar to the Morgan Stanley observation, id., but uses the terms "browsers" and "seekers":
The dichotomy of user profiles has been observed by a number of researchers . . . . Browsers display serendipitous navigation patterns and
hence do not actively search for information; the end result is not as
critical as the entertainment and hedonic nature of the process itself for
these people. Clearly, dedicated web sites and search engine ads may be
less effective than "cool sites" ads for these users. Seekers, on the other
hand, use a directed search approach where the ultimate goal is known
a priori . . . . Browsers are more likely to want to spend less time reading an ad that appear and will often "click through" given that they
navigate in a serendipitous sequence and that they are not pressed to
find a particular piece of information. Similarly, with the introduction of
search engine frames where ads appear first, the increased waiting period may be frustrating for the seeker, whose probability of click-through
is very low. The same argument can be made for the presence of graphic intensive sites that deplete critical downloading time. Seekers are
more likely to be annoyed by the presence of large graphic files if the
purpose is strictly information-based.
Fortin, supra note 115.
.. A recent study by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter stated:
The first banners were displayed in 1994, and received a click-through
rate [CTRI of about 10%. From there, it has been all downhill; [CTRs]
fell to 2-3% in 1996-97. 1998 saw [CTRs] reach 1%, and as of today they
have fallen even further; we estimate that today's [click-through rate] to
be in the 0.4% area.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, THE E-MARKETING REPORT 24 (May 2000), available
at <http://www.msdw.com/techresearch/emarketinglinfo.html> (visited Nov. 15, 2000).
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rates, marketing communication in Cyberspace is increasing at
unprecedented rates. In the first quarter of 2000, for example,
marketing communication expenditures in Cyberspace in9
creased by nearly 200% over first quarter 1999 amounts."
More importantly, the trend in web-based marketing communication clearly points to increased spending on sponsorship
rather than stereotypical advertisement.1 2 ° One reason for
this is that web users are thought to be more sophisticated
than the average consumer and thus not readily spurred to
action by stereotypical advertisement. In fact, web users might

19

First Quarter 2000 Internet Advertising Revenues Close in on $2 Billion,

available at <http://www.iab.net/news/content/first quliab-revs.html> (visited Nov.
15, 2000). In the second quarter, 2000, advertising expenditures rose to $2.1 billion, an increase of 127% over second quarter, 1999 spending. Internet Advertising
Revenues

Pass

$2

Billion

in

Second

Quarter 2000,

<http://www.iab.net/

news/content/adrevenuel00200.html> (visited Nov. 15, 2000). During the first and
second quarter, 2000, Internet advertising spending almost equaled the total
amount spent during all of 1999. Id.
1'

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, THE E-MARKETING REPORT, at 83 (Table 72)

(May 2000), <http://www.msdw.com/techresearch/emarketinglinfo.html> (visited Nov.
15, 2000). The report states that banners (which themselves might contain sponsorship language) and sponsorships make up 85% of all online marketing communication and predicts that through 2003, banners and sponsorships will continue
to represent at least 70% of all online advertising. The advertising industry trade
press is reporting similar trends:
Nineteen ninety-nine will mark the year that the much-maligned banner
ad, in all its shapes, forms and sizes, will be superseded by "strategic"
sponsorships online. These sponsorships will become the primary form of
advertising on the Internet and will account for the largest share of
online advertising dollars ....

In fact, the eAdvertising Report predicts

that online sponsorship in the U.S., which claimed 40% of online advertising in 1998, will experience steady growth, representing a full 58% of
all online expenditures by 2001.
Heather MacLean, Online Sponsorships to Supersede Banner Ads, STRATEGY, 15

(Sept. 7, 1999).
According to the eAdvertising Report, published by Web research firm
eMarketer, ad dollars from banner advertisements will migrate to strategic sponsorships, which claimed 40% of the online advertising dollars
placed in 1998. Sponsorships will grow steadily to represent 58 percent
of all online advertising expenditures by 2001. Banners won't disappear,
but they will take on a less important role, the report predicts.
Beth Cox, Report Predicts Banner Use to Decline, INTERNET NEWS (Apr. 23, 1999)

<http://www.internetnews.com/IAR/print/0,12-104121,00.html>.
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even respond in a negative manner to such advertisement.
Another important reason, though, is suggested by recent empirical data showing that the primary benefit of marketing
communication-brand awareness-can be had without an
actual click-through to a profit-seeker's Web page containing
stereotypical advertisement. 2 ' The conclusion holds true
whether the marketing banner contains what would be considered advertisement under the revised proposed regulations or
merely sponsorship language under those regulations.'22

121 Rex Briggs & Nigel Hollis, Advertising on the Web: Is There Response Be-

fore Click-Through? J. ADVERTISING RES. 33, 44 (March/April, 1997). The researchers randomly selected 1,232 web users who accessed a certain web page. Id. at
35. The users were asked to complete an online survey unrelated to the true
nature of the experiment. Id. After completing the survey, users were returned to
the web page from which they were recruited. Id. Each participant was returned
to the exact same page as any other participant, with the exception of a marketing communication banner. Id. One fourth of the participants received a web page
with a banner pertaining to men's apparel, one fourth received a banner pertaining to an internet service provider, one fourth received a banner relating to a
web browser, and one fourth received an unbranded banner for either men's apparel, internet service provider, or web browser. Briggs & Hollis, supra at 44.
The next day, the respondents were contacted via email and asked to respond to
another survey designed to test the effect of the previous day's banner exposures.
The researchers concluded from survey responses that users who were exposed to
branded banners were more likely to purchase the particular brands. With regard
to brand awareness the researchers concluded:
In short, click-through certainly has value (especially if the goal is to
create an immediate behavioral response such as downloading software),
but the click-through rate is unlikely to be indicative of the overall value
of a banner exposure . . . . The Web offers unique and undeniable advantages over other media in terms of targeting and direct marketing.
One such advantage is the ability of advertising banners to serve as
gateways to an advertiser's own Web site. But our results suggest that
the ad banner is a legitimate advertising vehicle in its own right ....
Banner ads remind people of a brand's existence, stimulate latent and
dormant brand associations, and can cause people to change their attitudes towards the brand, thus increasing their likelihood to purchase.
Id. In an even broader study, researchers found that "banner exposure itself was
responsible for 96% of the brand enhancement, while a clickthrough only contributed 4%." Internet Advertising Bureau and Millward Brown Interactive, 1997 LAB
at 10
(visited
Nov.
2,
2000)
Online Advertising Effectiveness Study,
<http://alita.mbinteractive.com/site/iab/study-formdownload.html>.
1
The banners used in the 1997 JAB Online Advertising Effectiveness Study,
supra note 120, can be viewed at <http://www.mbinteractive.com/site/iab/ads>. The
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Thus, some marketing consultants believe that stereotypical
advertising banners will soon be replaced altogether by sponsorship banners.12 3 In fact, many well known charitable organizations, such as the Public Broadcasting Station (PBS)'24
and the National Geographic Society,'25 actively and aggressively market sponsorship opportunities on their web pages.
Their marketing pitches are made almost exclusively in the
language of brand awareness. 26' Finally, as a demographic
matter, there is evidence that web-based marketing communication may soon evolve from the relatively inconspicuous banner mode, to a marketing communication that is automatically
presented to a web user while she is waiting for her target media to appear on her monitor. These "interstitials" 127 and

viewer will note that four of the twelve banners involved in the study would
likely qualify as sponsorship. Compare the banners for Cigar Aficionado, Kenwood,
Toyota, and Schick with the definition of sponsorship under the revised proposed
regulations. See supra note 83.
1

See MacLean supra, note 120.

See <http://sponsorship.pbs.org/online-only-benefits.htm>
2000). PBS' online sponsorship solicitation states:
12

(visited Nov. 20,

PBS.org offers you a variety of ways to reach your target audience
through innovative sites, channels, and publications. When you sponsor
PBS.org sites, your logo appears with a hyperlink to your own Web site,
making your sponsorship a powerful marketing tool that contributes
directly to your bottom line. By providing both sponsorship and banner
opportunities, PBS.org offers exciting ways to strengthen your corporate
image and meet your goals.
<httpJ/sponsorship.pbs.org/online-only-opps.htm> (visited Nov. 20, 2000).
12 The National Geographic Society's web page states:
nationalgeographic.com showcases your brand like no other site on the
Web, positioning your product among the highest quality editorial and
some of the world's most renowned images. The site's audience is overwheliningly well educated and affluent, and traffic continues to grow
exponentially, according to Media Metrix. The site is audited by the
Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC). Demographic and psychographic information is available from @plan.
<http'/www.nationalgeographic.com/about/advertising.html> (visited Nov. 20, 2000).
126 See supra notes 124-25.
" "Interstitials are large, nearly full-screen ads that often appear on browsers
as a new page is loading. Obviously this works best when the page being loaded
is heavy on graphics or movement, forcing it to load more slowly." Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, supra note 120, at 83.
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"superstitials"" are usually smaller than, and appear on top
of, the web page to which the user is destined. Significantly,
the user must execute a mouse click to make the marketing
communication go away and thereby to view her intended web
page."' Thus, although the communication is intended to be
polite and relatively unintrusive, it nevertheless demands the
user's attention at least for the period of time it takes the user
to make the communication go away.
With an understanding of web demographics in hand, we
can proceed first to a consideration of the Service's tentative
conclusions regarding whether a banner otherwise containing
sponsorship language should be considered advertisement by
virtue of its link to a page that is undoubtedly advertisement.
After that, we consider the whole notion that sponsorship may
be distinguished from advertisement in Cyberspace-a timeless
and place-less realm-by enforcing time and place separations
between the two forms of marketing communication. Completion of either task leads to a sense of utter futility, arising from
the realization that the real world rules, by which a rather
dubious distinction between sponsorship and advertisement is
enforced, are simply illogical and irrelevant in Cyberspace.
The first proposal-that a banner containing sponsorship
language but linked to a web page containing advertisement
should be deemed advertisement if the banner is animated-ignores the essential problem. Instead of focusing on the
near identity of time and place as between the sponsorship and
the advertisement, the proposal apparently focuses on the likelihood that the web user will click on the banner. To put the
matter in terms of our real world hypothetical, the proposal
focuses on the likelihood that a viewer of the first placard will
turn to the second placard or will enter the room directly behind the first placard.

" A superstitial is "another version of an interstitial, although not necessarily
a larger one. These are often animated and sometimes contain interactive features
like games. Users may click on a comer to remove the super/interstitial." Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, supra note 120, at 84.
' Id. More recent versions of super/interstitials simply go away on their own
unless the user clicks on the advertisement.
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The reasoning seems related to the idea that if a viewer is
unlikely to click through to the profit-seeker's advertisement
page, the profit-seeker could not possibly be buying advertisement in competition with taxable media. The problem, of
course, is that the proposal is based on assumptions that are
faulty on several levels. First, sponsorship banners are effective
means of marketing communication in Cyberspace even if the
web user does not click on the banner.13 The empirical data
suggests that most of the intended effect is obtained simply
from the banner itself, without an actual click-through. Second,
the reasoning conceptualizes the web user as a sort of easily
trained and manipulated actor who can be induced to exhibit
certain behavior by the display of bells and whistles. The evidence, instead, is that web users are self-regulated seekers
with defined purposes in Cyberspace. They go to particular
sources and very rarely click on banners of any sort. Certainly,
the evidence suggests that a web user's click-through is motivated by the user's own volition, rather than a sort of Pavlovian programmed response to stimuli appearing in the banner."1 Regardless, the implication that users are often induced to click on a banner will quickly be overcome by the
progress of technology and by the web's migration from banners to interstitials, and superstitials, which not only attract,
but require, a web user's attention and action. Hence, a distinction between sponsorship advertisement based upon a banner's
ability to attract a web user's attention and from there induce
a click-through is entirely unresponsive to the question of
whether a sponsorship banner linked to an advertisement page
is itself advertisement.
The second proposal-that a banner containing sponsorship
language but linked to a profit-seeker's web page from which
the web user can actually complete a transaction-more direct-

130 See supra note 121-22 and accompanying text.
"
"Another distinctive characteristic is that exposure to advertising is largely
controlled by the audience; the audience look for the marketer or the advertisement it wants to be exposed to rather than vice versa." Kuen-Hee Ju-Pak, supra
note 109, at 210.
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ly addresses the relevant issue. Under this proposal, the connection directly from a sponsorship page to a direct marketing
web page is apparently too close to ignore. But the proposal
seems artificially under-inclusive. Advertisement as defined in
the revised proposed regulations includes more than language
ultimately necessary to complete a commercial transaction.'3 2
If a link to a direct marketing page is too close to ignore, so too
is a linked page that contains stereotypical advertisement
though not an actual order form. In fact, the proposal seems
only to create the incentive for the placement of an intermediary page between the sponsorship banner and the final transaction page. Regardless, it seems unlikely that a profit-seeker
would link its sponsor banner directly to an order form. It is
more likely that a sponsor banner would be linked to a web
page containing stereotypical advertisement for a particular
product or range of products (showing the consumer exactly
what she may purchase), with that page containing an "order
here" link to another page. Thus, the second proposal, though it
directly addresses the issue of how the law should characterize
a sponsorship banner that directly connects to a web page containing advertisement, is too narrowly drawn to be of any real
consequence or to result in any real enforcement of the time
and place concept.
Indeed, the whole notion that the law should tax sponsorship communications in Cyberspace if the banner containing
that communication is linked to a web page containing advertisement seems overly formalistic, especially considering that

12 Prop. Treas.

Reg. 1.513-4(c)(2)(iv), 65 Fed. Reg. 11,012, 11,017 (March 1,

2000).
For purposes of this section, the term advertising means any message or
other programming material which is broadcast or otherwise transmitted,
published, displayed or distributed, and which promotes or markets any
trade or business, or any service, facility or product. Advertising includes
messages containing qualitative or comparative language, price information or other indications of savings or value, an endorsement, or an
inducement to purchase, sell, or use any company, service, facility or
product.
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the revised proposed regulations specifically allow the listing of
a profit-seeker's web address without taxation.13 3 Thus, a
sponsorship banner may contain the name "Coca-Cola" along
with the web address, "www.coke.com" and not implicate UBIT
if the banner is not linked to the stated web address. But clicking on a hyperlinked banner is merely a substitute for actually
typing the address and thereby being transported to the web
site. Since Cyberspace is populated mostly by seekers who are
not induced to action by bells, whistles, or even hyperlinked
text (the click-through rate being close to zero percent),
whether a banner containing a web address is hyperlinked
should have no effect on the probability that the web user will
visit the profit-seeker's site containing advertisement. It should
not matter at all whether a web user types a web address or
simply clicks on a banner. The web user will go, or not, depending on her own needs and inclinations. That is, allowing the
presentation of a profit-seeker's web address, but not allowing
the use of hyperlinked text to that address, will make no difference to a web user, if the web user is already inclined to
travel to the profit-seeker's advertising site. The difference in
tax consequence is one related to form rather than substance
and, therefore, does not address or further any tax policy.
A final irony related to the media of the new millennium is
that a rule of dubious validity in the real world will hasten the
onset of the feared real world consequences in Cyberspace (assuming those consequences really are likely to occur). It was
more than obvious almost forty years ago that sponsorship was
as much a tool of marketing communication as advertisement.
If the premise of UBIT is true, exempting sponsorship revenues
from taxation while taxing advertisement revenues will not
eliminate the market distortion caused by tax exemption because charities can sell the same commodity-marketing communication space-for less than the price at which that commodity may be had from taxable media. Profit-seekers are
increasingly spending their marketing communication budget

1"

See supra note 87 (stating specifically that listing sponsor's Internet address

is within definition of qualified sponsorship).
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on sponsorship rather than on stereotypical advertisement. The
final irony, then, is that to protect against the feared UBIT
consequences, the law should tax sponsorship communications
appearing in charitable Cyberspace media and exempt revenues from stereotypical advertisement.
VI. CONCLUSION

In her concurring opinion in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, Justice O'Connor accepted and adopted the strange
idea that Cyberspace can. be divided into zones, much like a
municipality can be divided into zones separating residential
areas from commerce and industry."' Her argument was that
various media in Cyberspace occupy "fixed locations on the
Internet."'3 5 If that were true, there would be some hope in
the effort to maintain the plausibility that sponsorship and
advertisement in Cyberspace must be kept separate in order
not to equate the two. The law could simply assign certain
separate and fixed locations, sufficiently far apart, for sponsorship and advertisement. The idea of fixed locations, though,
just doesn't apply in Cyberspace. Media in Cyberspace may
have been created "over there" but once published in
Cyberspace, that media is always "right here" according only to
the user's demand. A church in Cyberspace is just as much
right next to a red light district as it is to a library. The problem with Justice O'Connor's conceptualization, and indeed any
effort to enforce spatial and nonspatial distance in Cyberspace,
is that it fails to account for the fact that Cyberspace exists as
each individual web user interacts with it. As long as users
exercise individual volition, time and place will be irrelevant in
Cyberspace. Each individual user can keep one media-sponsorship-as close to, or as far from, another media-advertising-as she pleases.
Recognizing the irrelevancy of time and space in
Cyberspace-the fallacy of zones or fixed locations in
13

521 U.S. 844, 890-891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Ild. "Cyberspace undeniably reflects some form of geography; chat rooms and
Web sites, for example, exist at fixed 'locations' on the Internet." Id. at 890.
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Cyberspace-leads directly to the first observation concerning
the distinction between sponsorship and advertisement there.
That distinction simply cannot be made on the basis of a rule
that seeks to enforce a distance between the two. Sponsorship
relating to a particular brand or product will always be as
closely connected with, or as distant from, advertisement for
the same brand as the user pleases. Such is the very nature of
Cyberspace.
The Service might still seek an objective means of distinguishing sponsorship from advertisement, however implausible
that distinction really is. But to do so, the Service must attack
the nature of Cyberspace itself, or at least charitable media's
existence in Cyberspace. Since one media is right next to any
other in Cyberspace, because of the wonder of hyperlinks, the
Service could maintain a time and place distinction only by enforcing a ban on links from a sponsorship communication to an
advertising communication. And since a hyperlink is nothing
more than a shortcut for the user who might otherwise be inclined (regardless of any bells and whistles) to type the web
address for the page containing the advertisement, the rule
would also have to require that a sponsorship communication
not include the sponsor's web address. In this manner, and
only in this manner, the Service could impose and enforce a
time and space dimension in charitable Cyberspace. In effect, a
user would never be able to get there (to advertisement) from
here (from sponsorship).
The consequence of such a rule seems analogous to confining charitable radio broadcasts to AM frequencies while the
rest of the world utilizes FM frequencies, but only insofar as
the broadcast relates to a profit-seeker's marketing goals. Charitable media could link to various other media without fear of
taxation and therefore would not be entirely confined to an AM
version of Cyberspace. Perhaps that qualifier serves to ameliorate whatever negative consequences that would result from
such a rule. Still, there is something difficult to articulate, but
nevertheless disquieting, about encouraging, through taxation,
the severing of hyperlinks between communications in
Cyberspace.
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If that lingering feeling of discontent were to prevail, the
Service would have but one other option. Once it is accepted
that time and place are irrelevant in Cyberspace-that everything is right here and right now-the idea of enforcing fixed
locations for sponsorship sufficiently apart from advertisement
must necessarily be abandoned. Time and place are anathema
to Cyberspace, and so relying on those concepts is futile. A banner or other form of communication appearing on a web page
must instead be judged sponsorship or advertisement at face
value and without regard to the linking of that banner to some
other communication.
Recall that the fears motivating UBIT are unlikely to materialize in the real world and even less so in Cyberspace. If
intellectual honesty leads to the acceptance of the notion that
charitable hegemony is about as likely as a world without
Cyberspace, then settling on the second option would not be
such a monumental decision. Exempting revenues derived from
sponsorship communications in Cyberspace, even though that
communication is like the real world placard, directly behind
which is advertising, should have a nearly imperceptible impact on all other activities in Cyberspace. The impact would not
be completely imperceptible though. A set of ineffective but
invariably bothersome regulations would be noticeably and
thankfully absent.

